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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is prepared as a means for reviewing the literature
concerning aental health professionals' duty to warn third-party
individuals of potentially-dangerous clients.

It is intended to

present the tension between law and psychology, specifically where
the responsibilities of the therapist as a citizen and as a mental
health practitioner impose on him/her conflicting expectations.

The

review of literature is meant to illustrate the struggle in
maintaining strict confidentiality (a major tenet of therapeutic
work) while at the same time recognizing the obligation to dissolve
any confidence for the purpose of precluding clients' possible
illegal actions.

It is hoped that this paper will demonstrate the

/

need for further discussion and litigation which will allow the
practitioner's aethod of procedure in sensitive cases to be
routinely decided, rather than personally deliberated.
The information for this paper was located through use of
professional journals, books, case law and computer systems.
Examples of professional journals include the Mental Disabilities
Reporter and Behavioral Sciences and the Law.

Examples of books

include Psychotherapy, Confidentiality, and Privileged
Communications (1966) by Ralph Slovenko, and The Potentially Violent
Patient and the Tarasoff Decision in Psychiatric Practice (1985),
1
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edited by Jaaes Beck.

Case law includes that of the California

state courts along with federal cases found in the Federal Reporter
and the Federal Supplement.

The LUIS coaputer searches at the

Loyola University Library yielded journal articles such as "From
Tarasoff to Hopper: The Evolution of the Therapist's Duty to Protect
Third Parties" (Goodman. 1985).

The LEXIS system provided

approximately 19 cases at the federal district level and 17 cases at
the federal appeal level within the past nine years.
As an attempt will be made to show all those involved in the
mental health field who are affected by the duty to warn. an
examination of what is considered to be a aental health practitioner
will be explored first in the next chapter.

Because this legal duty

is intrinsically tied to the therapists' behavior, it is important
to consider the expectations and roles of these professionals.

In

this way, one might be able to see the extent to which this duty is
a help as well as a hindrance.

The development of new fields in

psychology is a paradox in that while the breadth of professions
•akes aore services available (for reasons of convenience. lower
expense, etc.), each of these specialties presents some difficulty
in assessing the limit to which the professional may be held liable
for negligence.

Unlike traditionally-recognized careers such as

psychiatrist or psychologist. •any areas of counseling are not
shaped by specific definition.

A brief examination of licensing

requirements will show the structure of these professions and their
ability to absorb the characteristics which are intrinsic to
traditional fields in psychology and psychiatry.

Because the
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counseling areas are very similar to these two professions. the
reader will be able to understand how important it is that
clarification be made of the duty to warn. not only for the sake of
psychologists and psychiatrists, but for all involved with clients
in a helping capacity.
The duty to warn is an ancient legal duty extending back to the
traditional law of England on which the United States founded their
own laws.

The third chapter of this thesis provides the reader with

historical background in law, specifically the inception of the duty
to warn.

While presenting the structure of the law and its

interpretations. effort is also made to set forth values that led
courts to create a duty to protect third parties involved.

Emphasis

is also placed on later arguments against the duty to protect.
These anticipate ramifications that could inflate liability and
allow people to be held accountable beyond their capabilities.

Many

of these arguments are made with the support of Section 315 of the
Restatement of Torts that confirmed the lack of duty where no
relationship between the defendant and third-parties existed.

It is

not surprising then that therapists and many others representing the
mental health fields faithfully maintain adequate, longstanding
rationales for rejecting imposition of this duty.
The quintessential case and the first to comment on the
confrontation between law and psychology is Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California at Berkeley (529 P. 2d 553 (1974)).

As

explained in Chapter IV, the Tarasoff precedent rests on two civil
cases, the original Tarasoff decision rendered in 1974 (also called
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"Tarasoff I") and the 1976 rehearing requested by professional
behavioral and health organizations. aaong them the American
Psychiatric Association (Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, 551 P. 2d 334 (1976)).
The 1974 Tarasoff case concerned the death of a young woman who
was attending the University of California. Berkeley in 1969.

She

was killed by a graduate student of the same university after she
rebuffed his advances.

The graduate student. Prosenjit Poddar. had

been seeing a psychologist at the school's clinic prior to the
aurder. and had disclosed intentions of killing an unnamed but
identifiable girl.

The crux of the issue was whether the therapist

had a legal duty to warn the victim or her family.

The state's

district court found no duty on the part of either the psychiatrist
or the police to warn.

Plaintiffs appealed and the next court

looked to both common law principles and the Restatement of Torts in
order to try to ascertain liability.

The court also stated that it

weighed the policy reasons of nondisclosure by therapists.

Its

first decision was to hold that the complaint could be aaended to
show a cause of action for the failure to warn.

A rehearing

requested by the American Psychiatric Association and other •ental
health organizations confused the duty further. and expanded it past
a warning.
Tarasoff had profound iapact on California.

Other cases

considering a siailar duty to warn were heard in the state's courts
almost iaaediately.

Also, there has been a substantial aaount of

duty cases filed in the federal courts of the ninth judicial circuit
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since Tarasoff.

Chapter V traces these cases, along with setting

forth the relevant studies that have been conducted concerning
California therapists.
Although Tarasoff remained within the state courts of
California. it had tremendous iapact on other state and federal
courts that were required to examine similar suits for the first
time.

The sixth chapter of this thesis demonstrates the influx of

duty to warn cases in federal districts across the country.

Through

synopses of these cases. it is shown how courts deliberate in
implementing such a duty based on the state's approval or rejection
of the Tarasoff rationales.

What is also available from this

chapter is the identification of those few cases subsequent to
Tarasoff which had similar notoriety within a certain region and
acted as new precedent.

The final chapter of this thesis looks to

recent articles of the APA Monitor and similar resources in the
field of psychology to show the impact of Tarasoff and its progeny.
Among these are the recent studies showing therapists' inability to
predict dangerousness. the aeasurable effects that the threat of
liability has had on various therapists and clients and
psychologists' reco•mendations for a reasonable standard of care
which would ult1aately protect them from negligence suits.

CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONER
Black's Law Dictionary (1983) describes a "practitioner" as one
"who is engaged in the exercise or eaployaent of any art or
profession as contrasted with one who teaches such" (p. 611).

In

determining who is a aental health practitioner, then. it seems
logical to include all those who provide a form of therapy and are
considered clinicians not academicians.

Although this thesis aay

soaeti•es focus on particular obligations belonging to physicians
and psychologists. an effort will be •ade to coaaent on all aental
health professionals.
Some illustrations of this kind of practitioner can be drawn
from authors in the field.

Several of thea define the aental health

profession as a "helping" profession.

For exaaple, according to

Braa111er and Shostru• (1982), "help" in a aental health field aeans
"providing conditions for people to fulfill their needs for
security, love and respect, self-esteem, decisive action, and selfactualizing growth'' (p. 3).

It also aeans "providing resources and

skills that enable people to help theaselves" (p. 3).

Although

Braaaer and Shostrua differentiate aaong the clinical and counseling
practices, the above liaited interpretation seeas to include the
characteristics intrinsic to all aental health professions.
Coraier and Coraier (1982) define a helpin2 professional as
6

"so•eone who facilitates the exploration and resolution of issues
and problems presented by a helpee or a client" (p. 2).

They

continue in saying that a helping relationship has four components:
someone seeking help, so•eone willing to give help, a helper who is
capable of treating, and a setting in which effective treat•ent
•ight occur.

They also state that the relationship involves a

series of stages.

For exa•ple, four stages •ight include for•ing

the relationship, setting goals, selecting strategies, and
evaluating/terainating.
Finally, Cavanagh (1982) defines counseling as "a relationship
between a trained helper and a person seeking help in which both the
skills of the helper and the ataosphere that be or she creates help
people learn to relate with the•selves and others in aore growthproducing ways" (p. 1).

Cavanagh emphasizes that a professional

counselor needs both counseling skills and a helpful personality.
Cavanagh believes a helpful personality to be the sum of individual
characteristics which enable a therapist to create a special
environaent.

Within this unique setting, the therapist confidently

uses the skills for the client's interest and the client trusts the
therapist.
According to Cavanagh, there are aany co•ponents in a
counseling personality.
sensitivity.

Allong these are warath, patience, and

Three other aspects, aore specific to the topic of

this thesis, are trustworthiness, honesty, and strength.

Cavanagh

defines trustworthiness as the ability of the counselor to assure
the client that confidentiality is absolute.

A trustworthy
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counselor does not cause his/her client to regret having confided in
the therapist.
genuine.

Similarly, a counselor who e•ploys honesty appears

A counselor listens to what the patient says and, in not

distorting or judging the patient's plight, tries only to understand
the client's feelings in relation to the facts told.

The

counselor's honesty encourages the client to be equally as honest.
as the counseling experience rests on the counselor's clear
interpretation of the situation and unconditional benevolence toward
the patient.

The patient should begin to experience, perhaps for

the first ti•e, a freedom to be honest without the fear of
rejection.

Finally, a counselor exhibiting strength is able to keep

himself/herself separate from the person in counseling.

Flexibility

(according to Cavanagh) is also a sign of professional strength.
These are just so•e of the views held by aental health scholars
and authors in regard to the role of the •ental health practitioner.
To be fair in authority, it is also necessary to consult legal
docuaents defining the titles of various •ental health professionals
according to education and skill, rather than characteristics.
of these are found in state statutes or codes.

Many

For exaaple, the

Mental Health and Developaental Disabilities Code of Illinois
describes a "clinical psychologist" as a psychologist registered
with the Illinois Departaent of Registration and Education who holds
either a doctoral degree or graduate degree in psychology fro• a
regionally accredited school and has a specified ainiawa aaount of
education (Ill. Dept. of Mental Health and Dev. Dis., 1987, Sec. 1103(a)(b)).

A "psychiatrist" is a "physician ... who has at least 3
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years of formal training or pri•ary experience in the diagnosis and
treat•ent of •ental illness" (Sec. 1-121).

A "clinical social

worker" means "a person who (1) has a Master's or doctoral degree in
social work from an accredited graduate school of social work and
(2) has at least 3 years of supervised post•aster's clinical social
work practice which shall include the provision of mental health
services for the evaluation, treatment and prevention of •ental and
emotional disorders" (Sec. 1-122.1).
In its Deceaber 1984 report, the National Clearinghouse on
Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation, along with the Council for
State Governments, prepared a report on the state credentialing of
the behavioral science professions.

The professions under study

included psychology, social work, counseling and •arriage and faaily
therapy.

The report is careful to indicate that a state's

regulation (registration, certification, licensure) is a newlydeveloped •ethod of controlling the •ental health professions.
Relying on a dictionary definition of behavior, the report
formulates its own definition of the behavioral sciences and says
that they are "the scientific study of persons' behaviors as the
people exist in their environments" (p. 1).

Thus, despite the

different regulatory histories and current standards of each of the
behavioral sciences, perhaps all can be described as having an
interest in hu•an interactions.
The •ajor thrust of the Clearinghouse report is to de•onstrate
the discrepancies in regulation of the behavioral sciences across
the states.

Unlike the licensure of psychiatrists as physicians,
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aental health practitioners are subject to different requireaents
and titles according to their education. experience and residency.
For example, depending on the state, a practitioner in any given
behavioral science field may be subject only to registration
(•ini•um reporting standards), or to aore stringent state agency
standards of certification. or, finally, to the aost strict
requireaents of licensure, which aake it illegal for a non-licensed
person to perform the specified services.
A study of this report for the purposes of this thesis provides
an overall understanding of the differences among the aental health
professions and. subsequently, a succinct definition of each.
Perhaps this was part of the report's purpose as well.

One idea

therein expressed is that state professional regulation serves to
delineate the scope of practice for a regulated profession.

Those

responsible for the report state that in identifying the required
knowledge and skill of the profession, the limitations of the
practice are outlined.

What is included constitutes the function of

the profession.
In the initial co•parisons of the behavioral science
professions, the authors point out that aarriage/faaily therapy
'
seems
the narrowest practice under the title but that each of the

professions can be tied together through the skills of counseling or
psychology subsumed by each.

As Coraier and Coraier (1982) imply,

these skills aay be understood as those abilities to clarify,
interpret, and sUllmarize the inforaation presented to the therapist
by the client.
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The •ental health field can be said to co•prise counselors.
social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists.

The authors argue

that a difficulty in the regulatory process is that each profession
aay include such a diverse set of tasks that any given member •ay be
regulated by different standards, according to the assigned job.
For example, although the lay•an may conjure one image of the
"counselor," the report points out that the states, in regulatory
procedures, discriminate among six different kinds of counselors.
These are professional counselors, pastoral counselors, drug
counselors. alcoholism counselors, substance abuse counselors, and
•arriage and faaily therapists (p. 42).
The report reveals that all professional counselors seeking
licensure have at least a Masters-level degree require•ent with 1-3
years of internship experience.

Those states reporting age

requireaents insist on counselors being at least 18-19 years of age.
Six states in the survey have continuing education requirements,
averaging 12-15 hours per year.

Not •uch inforaation is available

on pastoral counselors other than the fact that a Master's is
usually required with soae internship experience.
New Haapshire requires continuing education for pastoral
counselors but does not specify type.

Siailarly, not auch is

revealed for alcoholism or drug counselors other than Virginia
requiring a 500-hour drug progra• fro• an accredited college for the
drug counselor and coapletion of a 400-bour alcoholisa prograa for
alcohol counselors.

Each of these counselors in Virginia is

required to co•plete 60 hours of continuing education every two

12

years.

Maine requests 30 semester hours in college-level work and a

two-year substance abuse internship.
continuing education courses.

It does not require additional

It appears that •arriage and family

therapists need Master-level degrees or !!censure.

Florida and

Georgia request continuing education in this area.
As of 1985, five states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, North
Carolina, and Texas) e•ploy a scope of practice declaration to
define the practice of professional counseling, certainly the
broadest class of counselors.

The practice includes "rendering or

offering to render to individuals, groups, organizations or the
general public any service involving the application of principles,
•ethods, or procedures of the counseling professions which include
but are not restricted to 'counseling,

1

'appraisal activities,'

'consulting,' 'referral activities,' or 'research activities'' (p.
43).

It is necessary to explain here what each of these •eans.

According to the report, "counseling" is assistance in understanding
problems, developing plans and goals, and utilizing talents to •eet
needs.

"Appraisal activities" concern the use of educational tests

to determine an individual's potential, including his/her aptitudes,
abilities and interests.

"Consulting" occurs when scientific theory

is researched to provide further understanding of proble•s.
"Referral activities" are those that analyze data to determine
problems and consider referrals.

"Research activities" include

constructing and reporting research on hllllan subjects.

Marriage

therapy, on the other hand, is a "specialized service afforded to
individuals and married couples which centers pri•arily upon the
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relationship between husband and wife" (p. 43).

The paper cites New

Jersey law because it is •ost representative of states' scope of
practice:
The practice of •arriage counselor consists of the application
of principles, •ethods, and techniques of counseling and
psychotherapy for the purpose of resolving psychological
conflict, •odifying perception and behavior, altering old
attitudes and establishing new ones in the area of •arriage and
fa•ily life.
Alternatively, 33 states regulate at least one category of
social worker in some way (see Table 1).

The •ajority of the states

(23) license or certify at least one level of social worker.
Regulation is probably prevalent in this field due to the type of
work, level of responsibility, and type of supervision that the
social worker may receive.

The authors note that there are •any

different roles which individual social workers perform, but
nonetheless attempt to characterize the field through reprinting
Alabama's scope of practice which they believe is representative of
the •ajority of states:
Social work [is] the professional activity of helping
individuals, groups, or co••unities enhance or restore their
capacity for social functioning and of preventing or
controlling social proble•s altering societal conditions as a
•eans toward enabling people to attain their •axi•um potential.
These objectives are reached through referrals, counseling,
research and adllinistration of organizations engaging in such
practice.

The authors also cite the National Association of Social

Workers' Model Scope of Practice in showing that the profession is
guided toward "enhancing, protecting, or restoring people's capacity
for social functioning, whether i•paired by physical, enviro1111ental,
or e•otional factors" (p. 91).

This Act also touches on the
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clinical aspect of social work in that this field has the potential
for the "application of social work •ethods and values in the
diagnosis and treat•ent of •ental and e•otional conditions and in
providing psychotherapy" (p. 91).
According to this report. states which regulate (whether by
licensure, certification, or registration) reserve regulation for
persons with Master-level degrees in social work and several years
Table 1
State Regulation of the Behavioral Sciences

State
AL.

Counselor
Pastoral,
Family

co.

CN.
DE.
FL.
GA.

L
L

L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L

L
L
L/L/R*

L

L
L
L
L

c
c
L
L

HA.

ID.

IL.
IN.
IA.
KS.
KY.
LA.
ME.

L

c
c
c

L

c

R

MD.
MA.

c

MI.

R

MN.

MS.
MO.
MT.
NE.

L

L
L

AZ.
CA.

Social Worker

L

AK.
AR.

Psychologist

L

L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L

L
L
L
L
R

R

L
L
R

L
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Table 1 (continued)

state
NV.

NH.
NJ
NM
NY

NC

Counselor
Pastoral,
Pa11ily

c

L

c

c

L

L

c
L

OR

PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT

WV

WI
WY

DC

L
L
L
L
L
L
L

c

L

c
L
L

VT

VA
WA

Social Worker

c

c

ND

OH
OK

Psychologist

L/C**

L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
L

L

c

L

L/R**
L
R

R
R
L
L

L/C**
L

L
L

Key: L=Licensure; C=Certification: R=Registration
Cited as Table II-1 in State Credentialing of the Behavioral Science
Professions: Counselors, Psychologists and Social Workers. Prepared
by the National Clearinghouse on Licensure. Enforcement and
Regulation and the Council of State Govern•ents. reprinted with
per•ission. See Appendix A.
Source:

Health Professions Licensure Inforaation Systea, Septe•ber

1985.

*Three levels of social work practice are requested.
**Two levels of social work practice are requested.
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of supervised work experience.

States that have two categories

either distinguish between Bachelor and Master's degrees with
appropriate work experience. or between a social worker with a
Master's degree and one who is licensed for independent practice
which require additional supervised work experience.

States having

three categories usually co•bine the three distinctions above and
regulate:

a) social workers with a bachelor's degree. b) social

workers with an advanced degree in social work, and c) social
workers with an advanced degree in social work and several years of
supervised work experience.

The states that have four categories

ordinarily recognize an associate degree in addition to the
categories above.
Citing Perspectives on Health Occupational Credentialing
(1979), the committee of the National Clearinghouse shows that while
the medical profession reflects uniform scopes of practice. the
field of psychology reveals even greater diversity among the states
than does social work.
According to this report, all the states. including Puerto Rico
and the District of Columbia, regulate psychologists.

Most of the

states (47) regulate through licensure while the rest (five). eaploy
certification aethods.

The authors rely on the Model Practice Act

prepared by the Aaerican Psychological Association to represent aost
states' statutes.

This states:

The practice of psychology includes. but is not liaited to,
psychological testing and evaluation or assessaent of personal
characteristics such as intelligence. personality, abilities,
interests and aptitudes: counseling, psychotherapy, hypnosis,
biofeedback training and behavior therapy; diagnosis and
treatment of aental and eaotional disorder or disability,
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alcoholism and substance abuse, and the psychological aspects
of physical illness or disability, psychoeducational
evaluation, remediation, and consultation. Psychological
services •ay be rendered to individuals, families. groups, and
the public (Cited in State Credentialing of the Behavioral
Sciences, 1986. p. 66).
The authors go on to say that what seems to be the real
demarcation for the factions of scopes of practice is whether the
state's focus is on health services or whether it leans toward a
wider range of activities which may •ean consultations and/or
organizational counseling.

In a health-services approach. terms

such as "assessment." "diagnosis," "treatment," or "organic" (as
relating to brain dysfunctions) aay be found in the state statutes.
If a state regulates its psychologists through licensure, then
either a Ph.D. or a Master-level degree integrated with 3-5 years of
work experience is required.

Most states require good moral

character and half the states have a ainimum age requirement.
According to the authors •entioned previously, namely Bramaer
and Shostrum, Cormier and Cormier. and Cavanagh. what seems
especially important to the therapeutic process is the existence of
the helping relationship itself.

A situation in which one person is

to professionally help another during a time of emotional
crisis/stress would undoubtedly have to rest on a foundation of
trustworthiness, honesty, and good faith.

On its face, this seems a

fair expectation.
Nonetheless. it is exactly this understanding which. when
juxtaposed with the therapist's legal responsibilities, changes the
practitioner's role into an enigaa.

For exa.11ple, a therapist who is

held ethically to •aintain the confidence of his/her client is also
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expected, even mandated by law, to divulge that confidence when
he/she knows or suspects that the client is dangerous to
himself/herself and others.

In effect, a third party, unknown to

the therapist, aay become the plaintiff in a lawsuit later brought
against the saae therapist. who has consistently tried to act in an
ethical and trustworthy manner.
As the states vary in their regulations of mental health
practitioners. so do they vary in protecting the client through
privilege statutes.

In their book, Privileged Communications in the

Mental Health Professions, Knapp and Van DeCreek (1987, p. ix)
differentiate between confidentiality and privilege in explaining
that the former refers to laws or ethics that govern the privacy of
information while the latter is a narrower term referring only to
the legal right that patients may invoke for protection of their
confidences and preclusion of these for evidence in court.

The

authors explain that Congress or state legislatures determine
necessary privileged relationships.

The process involves a careful

balancing of benefit and potential harm to society.

Also considered

is the fact that a proper verdict in trial aay not be reached if
some evidence is withheld from the court.
Privilege statutes vary.
client privilege.
psychologists.

All states include the attorney-

Most states include clergy, physicians and

Social workers, counselors, journalists. and nurses

are protected in some states.

Only a few states have privilege laws

for detectives, trust coapanies, and accountants (pp. 3-4).
For a considerable time, psychotherapists (including
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psychiatrists) did not have the protection of a physician-patient
privilege.

Early advocates for the protection of psychological

interviews pressed for a statute not through reference to the
physician-client privilege, but rather through showing an important
difference.

They argued that a psychotherapist needs even more

privilege than a physician because of the nature of the problems
presented and the social stigma attached to them.
The authors indicate that state legislatures began to protect
these relationships only in the late 1940s.
psychotherapy before World War II.

No state commented on

Afterwards. however, states

began to recognize a need for the protection of psychotherapeutic
communications with the increase of practitioners.

Knapp and Van

DeCreek's review, as of 1985, showed that 47 states and the District
of Columbia have privileged communications statutes for
psychologists.

Twenty-eight states have privileged communication

statutes for social workers.

Twenty states specifically cover

psychiatry while 30 other states and the District of Columbia
protect psychiatrists under the physician-patient privilege.
Although Tarasoff does not concern privileges, some •ention is
needed in order to fully unveil disclosure problems.

The privilege

statutes are noteworthy because they are further indication of the
i•portance that society places on confidentiality.

Although

•entioned originally in the physicians' Hippocratic Oath in the 19th
century, the idea of absolute privacy has expanded from ethical
guidelines.

This respect for privacy has grown as the •ental health

professions themselves have grown.

Privacy is viewed as such a
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crucial part of treatment that it can now be involved as a legal
right on behalf of the patient.
Privilege communication statutes. like the regulations on the
mental health profession, serve to further define the role of the
•ental health practitioner.

Intrinsic to his/her code of

professional ethics is an expectation to use reasonable care and to
keep private what should remain private.

The promise of absolute

secrecy can be considered a genuine component of treataent, a
special form of "help" not available to the client outside of these
professional relationships.
Against this background of aental health practice, the problems
of Tarasoff and the implications of their resolution will be
studied.

What follows is the birth of duty principles, an

additional and different set of responsibilities which this kind of
professional faces.

CHAPTER III
HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO WARN
This thesis concerns tort law.

An historical overview is

necessary to lay the groundwork and to unveil the i•plications of
tort principles which ultimately shaped the Tarasoff decision.

The

thrust of Tarasoff revolved around the concept of duty, specifically
the •ental health practitioner's duty to warn third parties of
potentially violent patients.

This duty is difficult to qualify:

perhaps it is best explained as emanating from what is com•only
called negligence.
In his article "Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts,"
Murphy (1981) traces the develop•ent of duties in the United States
by beginning with traditional notions established in England during
the early 19th century.

What follows in this third chapter of the

thesis is a summary of Murphy's construction of the duty to warn.
The cases cited are those Murphy used to chronicle the development
of the duty to warn.
The hallmark case. according to Murphy, was Heaven v. Pender
(1983) Q.B.D. 503.

The plaintiff in this case was a boat painter

who sustained injuries when the stage next to the boat fell.

He

brought suit against the dock owner with who• he was not in
relationship (privity of contract), but who nonetheless provided the
stage so that the boat could be painted.
21

This was first court to
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consider duty as developing fro• foreseeability.

Lord Esher used

the Pender case to say that a duty is defined as the relation which
becomes apparent in an inherently dangerous situation.

He

illustrated this by two ship captains who assume a duty toward each
other at the realization that their individual ships •ay crash into
one another.

It has been said that Esher's theory was innovative

because it was a•ong the first to describe duty in terms of
foreseeability and relationship, not solely privity.

Privity,

according to Black's Law Dictionary (1983), is the "mutual or
successive relationships to the same right of property, or such an
identification of interest of one person with another as to
represent the same legal right" (p. 626).

Coined "the larger

proposition," Esher's theory was said to be founded in humanism and
natural law.
Pender may be thought to have been precedent for many ensuing
American cases.

Yet, Murphy is careful to point out that a case

based on similar reasoning had already been decided in the States 30
years prior to Pender.

Thomas v. Winchester (1852). held a

manufacturer of poisonous pharmaceuticals liable despite the lack of
contract or privity between the manufacturer and the
consumer/plaintiff.

Here, the duty of care was said to arise from

the nature of the profession and the defendant's awareness of the
possibility of illness or death after ingestion of defectively
•anufactured or i•properly labeled drugs.

Probably a aajor reason

for the increase in finding liability was the fact that Winchester
involved a toxic substance and that it would see• unconscionable to
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allow liability to pass on technical grounds.

Thus, at the

beginning of the 20th century, both England and the United States
were •utually affirming that duty need not be confined to the
traditional context of privity, especially in terms of inherently
dangerous situations.

Rather, both courts were willing to rely on

humanistic theories for anticipating liability.
Murphy explains that in 1916, New York courts expanded on the
Winchester decision by finding a •anufacturer of a defectivelydesigned wheel liable to subsequent accident and injury to the
plaintiff/car buyer (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.).

The court

reasoned that such a product can be as dangerous to human life as
the poison in the Winchester case.

Winchester also relied on Pender

that disregarded the need for formal privity relationships between
the parties.

Rather, as in Winchester, a duty evolved to those

reasonably foreseeable victims. users of the product.
An interesting twist of events happened in this country in 1928
with the New York decision of H.R. Moch v. Rennselaer Water Co ..
Here, Justice Cardozo had the opportunity to rely on above-named
cases for allowing recovery to a plaintiff who suffered fire damage
when the water company neglected to properly channel water to
hydrants.

The proble• was clearly foreseeable.

It seems that it

could certainly have been said that the water company's obligation
to the plaintiff was narrower than that of the company to huaanity
at large, and that there were identifiable victims.

Genuine human

interests were at stake.
Nonetheless. Cardozo's reasoning swung the decision in the
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opposite direction, and liability was found not to exist based on
the fact that there was no relationship similar to "privity."
Instead of relying on MacPherson and Winchester precedent. Cardozo
retreated by resorting to the clear, yet seemingly oversimplified
rationale of the ancient English case of Winterbotto• v. Wright
(1842).

In Winterbottom, a passenger of a stagecoach could not sue

the manufacturer of the carriage for injuries sustained due to the
lack of privity.

Cardozo reasoned that a stage coach was not like a

poison. or even a defective wheel: it was not dangerous by itself.
Thus. Cardozo aade a conscious effort in H.R. Moch to keep alive
ancient notions of duty lest they die out with the incursion of
foreseeability and relational concepts found in the line of cases
beginning with Winchester.
Murphy explains that in 1928, then. there were two distinct but
coexisting forms of tort law in the United States.

For the next six

years. courts had to choose between which of these was better law in
individual circuastances.

A major stance was finally taken in 1934

with the compilation of the Restateaent of Torts.

Following aore

the Winterbottom theory on duty, the Restate•ent said in Section 314
that "The actor's realization that action on his part is necessary
for another's aid or protection does not of itself iapose upon him a
duty to take such action" (p. 854).

It also said in section 315

that there was no duty to control the conduct of another unless

6

special relationship existed between the first person and the one
whose conduct needed to be controlled or if a special relationship
existed between the first person and the potential victi• where in
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the latter situation. there would be a duty to protect.

Section 319

stated that one who of his/her own volition took charge of another
person known or likely to be dangerous is obliged to control the
person fro• doing harm.

Section 320 made clear that one exercising

custody over another is obliged to protect that person from harm by
others if the custodian knows or should know that he/she has ability
to control conduct of the other and if he/she knows or should know
of the necessity for exercising the control.

There were some

exceptions for a duty to control and protect but these were limited
to special relationships such as parent/child, •aster/servant, owner
of land/licensee.

Mention is also made of those who are in charge

of persons having dangerous propensities.
An application of the Restatement yielded Richards v. Stanley
in 1954.

Here, there was no liability for a defendant who left his

keys in his care. thereby indirectly allowing a thief to take the
automobile and subsequently injure a plaintiff.

Although the act

was foreseeable by the defendant. and although the defendant could
be said to have so•e duty to protect nearby pedestrians. the court
found through application of the Restatement that no privity existed
between the defendant and the injured plaintiff.

No obligation on

the part of the defendant could be found.
Murphy cites in a footnote an important article having
co•menting on the i•plications of the Restatement.

Entitled "The

Duty to Control the Conduct of Another." (1934), authors Harper and
Kime co••ented on the policy of tort law at that ti•e in ter•s of
its "relational character.•

In stating that human beings constantly
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enter into relationships, tenuous and otherwise, these authors
explained that only current social policies really distinguish those
relationships which demand special protection.

They continued by

stating that coamon law is an atteapt to incorporate the attitude of
the coamunity into legal rules.

Although they added that the

categories were flexible. Harper and Kime were nonetheless eager to
identify potential problems with the development of the duty to warn
at the time.

Thus, they felt that when ... "novel cases involving

the problem arise, it will becoae the duty of the judges to exaaine
the analogies of such cases as (already) are discussed ... and to
determine whether, in the light of human experience as reflected in
the decisions. the relations of the parties fall into one or the
other of the general divisions aentioned" (p. 905).
Although Tarasoff was not to arrive until years later. legal
scholars at the tiae of the first Restateaent could already see the
fallibility in clinging only to the deaarcations set out in Section
315.
It was the Restatement of Torts (Second) in 1985 that
enuaerated the exceptions. in fora of particular professions, to the
no-duty rule.

These included persons known as co•mon carriers.

innkeepers, possessors of land, and those. such as police or prison
wardens who actually took soaeone subject to their control.

These

exceptions were based on all of the tort cases. with the exception
of one. that had occurred between 1934 and 1985.
Murphy explains that this second Restateaent. however. still
only acknowledged relationships that were already socially
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recognized and did not consider the relationship that "evolved" as
that in Pender.

Cases like Pender would have to be reconciled,

indeed co•pro•ised, under one of the strict categories in the
Restatement.

As stated before. this will later be seen as one of

the initial handicaps that coaplicated the Tarasoff case a few years
later.
According to Murphy, the second Restateaent was initiated after
many conflicting cases had come to the court.

For exa•ple, Wright

v. Arcade {1964) refused recovery to a five-year-old injured by a
school bus because the boy had no relationship with the school
district.

On the other hand, the court in Rayaond v. Paradise the

previous year found liability against the bus company because there
was no supervision in a bus loading zone. an areas which the court
thought was deaonstrative of a general relationship between the bus
coapany and its passengers.

In response to these cases. Murphy says

that the juxtaposition of the cases reveals a tendency to rely on
Section 315's "special relationship" analysis when the court was
determined to avoid liability, and a decision to find a general
relationship through the special circuastances of the Section when
the court wanted to establish a duty.
The purported cornerstone case at this tiae, however. was Aaaya
v. Hoae, Ice, and Fuel Co. (1963).

Here, in Alllaya, there was the

final shift in California fro• a no-duty rule to that of a general
duty of care founded on foreseeability.
aajor ra11ifications of Amaya:

Murphy points out three

1) Aaaya was the first return to the

Pender reasoning since MacPherson: 2) Because of Aaaya, the no-duty
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concept would still be available but only through aanipulating the
reasance dichotoay and the privity concept.

Consequently, Section

315 would have a bigger role to play in liability-denying rationales
because it would be the strongest precedent for showing no duty
absent a special relationship; 3) Amaya shows the deaarcation
between the no-duty factions and the pro-duty factions in terms of
the subject of huaan safety.
Subsequent to the second Restateaent, Dillon v. Legg (1968)
overruled Allaya in saying that a "zone of danger" standard was too
strict in limiting foreseeability.

With the Rowland v. Christian

case. the saae California court aoved further to abolish the no-duty
rule.

Rowland concerned personal injury to a friend of the

defendant when plaintiff cut hiaself on a water faucet in
defendant's house.

The ruling in Rowland abandoned classifications

of trespassers, licensees, and invitees along with respective duties
of care that had been owed to each group by the landowner up to this
time.
Murphy explains that in leaving the no-duty rule coapletely.
the courts sought to define a general duty of care.

This kind of

duty could be ascertained through the asking of two basic questions.
In order to find liability in a situation, the court would first ask
i f "there was a sufficient relationship of proxiaity or neighborhood

such that in reasonable conteaplation carelessness on one's part
would likely cause damage" (p. 167).
facie duty."

If so, there existed a "prima

The second question to ask would be if there were any

considerations which ought to negate or liait the scope of the duty.
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The answer to the second question would be the initial deter•inative
answer of liability.
According to Murphy, Rowland was iaportant because it appeared
as the first "definitive" stateaent in the United States adopting
the larger proposition found in Pender.

Murphy points out that

there was a feeling that this fundamental principle that was foraed
would aake no distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.
According to Black's Law Dictionary, aisfeasance is the i•proper
performance of an act which is lawful. while nonfeasance is the
omission of something which a person ought to do.
These were the developaents that had thus far occurred by the
time Tarasoff reached the courts.

Murphy explains that the two

lines of tort develop•ent. the first representative of the PenderRowland "larger principle" doctrine and the other traceable to
Winterbottom (and evidenced in Section 315 of the Restatement),
combined in the Tarasoff case.

In finding the defendant

psychotherapists liable for their failure to warn. the court relied
on both the funda•ental principle fro• Rowland and the special
relationship analysis of Section 315 of the Restatement.

CHAPTER IV
THE TARASOFF DECISION
The Tarasoff precedent rests on two civil cases, the original
Tarasoff decision rendered in 1974 (also called "Tarasoff I") and
the 1976 rehearing requested by professional behavioral and health
organizations, among them the American Psychiatric Association.

The

second hearing was an effort to alleviate the fears of
psychotherapists who confronted new, unclear responsibilities as a
result of Tarasoff.

Dr. Ja•es C. Beck, author of The Potentially

Violent Patient and the Tarasoff Decision in Psychiatric Practice
(1985), said that the 1976 ruling was even •ore distressful than the
first as the duties for psychotherapists were expanded. but not
clarified (p. 6).
It is also extremely important to note that the Tarasoff
opinion does not deteraine whether Dr. Moore, the •urderer's
psychologist, or the University of California outpatient clinic was.
in fact, negligent.

The case only purports that there is a cause of

action to be tried and that the case is appropriate for remand to
the lower courts.

There, the findings of fact, the jury. are still

free to determine whether or not Dr. Moore had used due care and
saved himself from negligence.

Unfortunately, the case never

reached remand because it was settled out of court before retrial.
These unfortunate circu•stances add to the confusion of aental
30
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health practitioners' understanding as to what constitutes
negligence (Reisner, 1985, p. 105).
The facts of the Tarasoff cases represent one year in the lives
of Prosenjit Poddar and Tatiana Tarasoff. two students at the
University of California at Berkeley.

A graduate student, Poddar

met Miss Tarasoff at a folk dance in October of 1968.
other at social events approxi•ately once a week.

They saw each

Poddar thought

that the relationship was serious, but Tatiana told him that it was
not.

There are no explanations for Tatiana's response in the cases

nor com•enting texts.

As a result of her refusals. Poddar beca•e

withdrawn and cried often.
work.

His speech was erratic.

He ignored his

He was preoccupied with his infatuation and spent hours with

his rooamate analyzing tape-recorded conversations with Tatiana.
aentioned being in love with Tatiana.
Tatiana left for South Allerica.

He

During the next su•mer,

Poddar, suffering from a lack of

concentration and unable to pursue his studies. entered outpatient
psychotherapy at the Cowell Me•orial Hospital of the University of
California on June 5. 1969.
What aay see• additionally iaportant, especially for the
purposes of this research. is that Poddar was of Indian background
and a ae•ber of the Harijan caste, those known as "untouchable."
very brief description of the caste syste• aay be in order.
India, the •ajority of people (approximately

83~)

A

In

are Hindus,

followed by Muslias (approxi•ately 11%), then Christians and
Buddhists.

The Hindus are aeparated into social classes or castes.

Each caste is usually associated with a specific occupation (priest,
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artist, faraer), and the caste serves as a peraanent identification.
A person is born into a caste and cannot leave it.

There is a

particular set of rules governing conduct for each caste; aarriage
rarely occurs between aeabers of different castes.

For aany years,

a group called "untouchables" has been considered perhaps the lowest
social class in that its •embers exist outside the caste systea and
rank even below the lowest caste.

They are a ainority, coaprising

only about 15% of the Indian population.

Although the 1950 Indian

Constitution &11eliorated the untouchables' social status soaewhat by
granting them equal rights as full citizens, there are still a
nuaber of Hindus who believe that this group should not encroach on
society (World Book Encyclopedia, 1985, pp. 100-101).
With this background available on Poddar. it aight be useful
from a psychological perspective to speculate on his aotives for
pursuing Tatiana and the reasons for his increasing despair over her
rebuffs.

Martin E.P. Seligaan, a clinical and experiaental

psychologist, has studied the experience of "helplessness" and how
it is tied to eaotional disturbance.

He states in his book,

entitled Helplessness (1975), that this kind of despair is "the
psychological state that frequently results when events are
uncontrollable" (p. 9).

Although auch of his book centers on

laboratory experiaents, he insists that the results can be
analogized to eaotional and psychological breakdowns in huaans.

He

says that organisas which are capable of learning helplessness
suffer a decrease in aotivation, an inability to recognize success,
and a heightening of eaotion.

Thus. in light of the fact that
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poddar learned that he was born into a caste about which he could do
nothing, and in light of the apparent weakness of the Indian people
to fully accept the idea of "untouchables" as full citizens, Poddar
aay have seen Tatiana's rejection as further proof of his
helplessness and his genuine inability, despite fervent effort, to
obtain what he desired.
Although the counsel for Poddar did not assert a defense of
helplessness, they did seek to de•onstrate diminished capacity.
Defense implored the courts to allow the testi•ony of an
anthropologist who had lived in India for 20 years and had
particularly studied problems that Indian students had in adjusting
to Allerican universities.

It was hoped that her testiaony could

substantiate a direct link between the stress endured by Poddar and
his aotivation for killing Tatiana.

Although the court invited the

defense council to pose relevant. hypothetical questions to the
anthropologist, it did not allow the defense counsel to use the
witness as an expert.

The court reasoned that diainished capacity

was a mental illness that was subject to direct testiaony only by
those professionals in the aental sciences.
Unlike his usual practice, Dr. Gold, the psychiatrist who
evaluated Poddar at Cowell, told Poddar at the first interview that
his behavior was quite abnoraal and could be diagnosed as paranoid
schizophrenic .. The psychiatrist was a aember of the inpatient staff
and decided that Poddar did not require hospitalization.

He

prescribed a neuroleptic (a tranquilizer and antipsychotic drug) and
then referred Poddar to Dr. Moore, a clinical psychologist on the
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outpatient staff who conducted weekly psychotherapy.
On August 18, 1969 during one of his therapeutic sessions.
Poddar disclosed thoughts of haraing, or even killing an unnamed
girl.

She was, however, identifiable to Dr. Moore as Miss Tarasoff.

According to the criminal case, People v. Poddar (1972) (summarized
in Appendix B). Poddar also told a aale friend his intention to kill
Miss Tarasoff, by possibly blowing up her rooa.

He also disclosed

to either this person or another friend that he felt he could not
control hi•self.

The court does not see• disturbed by the lack of

facts concerning how Dr. Moore could identify the victim.

In a

footnote to the 1976 rehearing, the court says that "We recognize
that in some cases it would be unreasonable to require the therapist
to interrogate his patient to discover the victia's identity ... But
there •ay also be cases in which a mo•ent's reflection will reveal
the victim's identity" (p. 345, fn.11.).
Dr. Moore also apparently learned from a friend of Poddar that
Poddar planned to purchase a gun.
scarce.

Details about this conference are

The criainal case states that grounds of premeditation

included Poddar's possessing a gun and asking if that kind of gun
could kill someone.
this question.

The record does not disclose to whom he asked

Dr. Moore became concerned about Poddar and

consulted with Dr. Gold and the assistant to the director of the
departaent of psychiatry, Dr. Yandell.

After deciding that Poddar

needed hospitalization, Dr. Moore phoned and then wrote to caapus
police on August 20th, explaining that Poddar's dangerousness aet
California's civil coaaitaent criteria, that he was probably
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paranoid schizophrenic, and that he should be detained
involuntarily.

Whether or not Poddar actually aet the coamitaent

criteria is not discussed in the analysis of Tarasoff.

Focus is on

the relevant civil coamitment statute. the Lanteraan-Petris-Short
Act. in order to deteraine whether the defendant psychotherapists
could enjoy the iamunity therein described for government officials.
According to the case, the County of Alaaeda had never appointed the
Cowell Memorial Hospital, nor any of its aembers to begin
involuntary co.. itaent proceedings in accordance with the Welfare
and Institution Code.

Despite the fact that, according to the Act,

the lacked status to aake coamitaent judgMent, the Court nonetheless
awarded the• iaaunity on the basis of their power to make
recoamendations for coaaitaent.
Campus police aid was requested in coaaitting hia.

Three

ca•pus police officers, one with whoa Dr. Moore had previously
spoken, interviewed Poddar extensively and decided that he was
rational and not dangerous.

Although it is uncertain what Poddar

said, he promised to stay away fro• Tatiana and was then released.
According to plaintiffs' allegations, Dr. Powelson, Director of
the Department of Psychiatry at the ti•e, ordered that no further
action be taken to place Poddar in a 72-hour facility.

Dr. Powelson

asked the police to return Dr. Moore's letter and also ordered that
all copies of the letter and notes that Dr. Moore had taken as
therapist be destroyed.

As the cases do not disclose any of

Powelson's stateaents, one can only speculate as to his aotives for
ordering these actions.

Perhaps he feared appearing to have
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authority to coaait Poddar.

Neither Tatiana nor anyone in her

family was notitied of the threats nor the behavior of Poddar that
would suggest his violent tendencies toward plaintiff.
not stay in treatment.

Poddar did

Although reasons are not stated, it may be a

result of his being detained by the police and thus, his losing
confidence in Dr. Moore.

At this tiae, he then befriended Tatiana's

brother and encouraged hia to be his roommate.

Tatiana, who had

been in Brazil. returned to Berkeley in the fall of 1969 and again
rejected Poddar's advances.
On October 27, 1969, Poddar went to Ms. Tarasoff 1 s home.

She

was absent and Tatiana's mother, perhaps sensing danger, asked him
to leave.

Poddar, however, returned later with a pellet gun and a

butcher knife, to find Ms. Tarasoff alone.
him and began screaming.
fro• the house.

She refused to talk with

He shot her with a pellet gun and she ran

He followed her and stabbed her to death.

Afterwards, he called the police and requested that he be
handcuffed.
Subsequent to the death of their daughter, the Tarasoffs sued
the University, including both the campus police and the student
health service psychotherapists.

In their allegations, the

Tarasoffs said that the psychotherapists had been negligent in not
warning Ms. Tarasoff of Poddar's threats and in not confining him.
They also charged that the police had been negligent in only
questioning Poddar and in not detaining hia further.
The defendants (collectively, the University of California)
deaurred.

In essence, they asserted that the plaintiffs had no
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cause of action to pursue, even if all of the facts were true.

They

said that even if the plaintiffs' allegations were true, there
really was no legal duty on the part of either the psychotherapists
or the police to protect or to warn.

The court accepted this

argument and dis•issed the Tarasoffs' complaint on the grounds that
it failed to state a cause of action.

The Tarasoffs appealed and

this led to Tarasoff I which was decided Deceaber 28, 1974.
The plaintiffs' complaint concerned four causes of action
comprising two grounds of liability:

1) Defendants' failure to warn

plaintiffs of the impending danger. and 2) Defendants' failure to
use reasonable care to bring about Poddar's confine•ent.

Defendants

asserted that they owed no duty of reasonable care to Tatiana and
that they were i••une fro• suit under the California Torts Clai• Act
of 1963.

As an aside, the Act allows indemnification of employees

against liability, so long as there is no bad faith.

The defense

relied on the Act because specific sections of its Govern11ent code
allowed i•aunity for governaent officials who exercise discretionary
commitment decisions.
The court found liability on two rationales for the first
ground.

The court found defendants not liable on the second ground.

The plaintiffs' four causes of action include:

1) Failure to

detain a dangerous patient, 2) Failure to Warn on a Dangerous
Patient, 3) Abandon•ent of a Dangerous Patient, and 4) Breach of
Pri•ary Duty to Patient and the Public (p. 341).

The first cause of

action sketches the chronology of how Moore had consulted with
psychiatrists at Cowell Meaorial Hospital, had notified ca•pus
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police that Poddar would be detained, and had requested the aid of
the police depart•ent in assisting hi•.
Plaintiffs' second cause of action, "Failure to Warn on a
Dangerous Patient," incorporates the charges of the first cause. but
also adds that the defendants negligently per•itted Poddar to be
released from police custody without "notifying the parents of
Tatiana Tarasoff that their daughter was in grave danger fro•
Prosenjit Poddar" (p. 341).
Plaintiff's third cause of action, "Abandonment of a Dangerous
Patient," sought $10,000.00 in punitive damages against defendant
Dr. Powelson.

The complaint stated that Powelson "did the things

herein alleged with intent to abandon a dangerous patient, and said
acts were done •aliciously and oppressively" (p. 341).
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action, "Breach of Priaary Duty to
Patient and the Public," states allegations si•ilar to the first
cause of action, but it seeks to characterize defendants' conduct as
a breach of duty to safeguard their patient and the public.

The

court says that the first and fourth causes of action are
essentially the sa•e allegations.
In analyzing the real substance of the co•plaint, the second
cause of action, the court first refers to Dillon v. Legg in saying
that liability is usually found where there are allegations of
negligence, proxiaate cause. and da•ages.

The defendants' argument

here is that in the circu•stances of the present case, they
(defendants) owed no duty of care to Tatiana or her parents and
that, in the absence of such duty, they were free to act in
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disregard for Tatiana's life.
The court expounds on its theory of "duty" by saying that
duties are not facts to be discovered, but are conclusory
expressions found in particular cases.

The court also refers to

Prosser (1964) who said that "[Duty] is not sacrosanct in itself,
but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is
entitled to protection" (cited in Tarasoff I, p. 557).
Rowland v. Christian was consulted for a listing of so•e of
those policy considerations.

These included:

the foreseeability of

har• to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the •oral bla•e
attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to
the com11unity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved (69 Cal. 2d 108, 1113).
The Court ad•its that under co••on law, one generally owes no
duty to control the conduct of another (Richards v. Stanley) nor to
warn those endangered by such conduct (Rest. 2d Torts. Sec. 314).
However, the court is also careful to point out that courts have
noted exceptions to this rule.

According to the court, there have

been two situations where courts have !•posed a duty of care:

(1)

cases in which the defendant stands in so•e special relationship to
either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a
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relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct (Secs. 315320), and (2) cases in which the defendant has engaged, or
undertaken to engage, in affiraative action to control the
anticipated dangerous conduct or to protect the prospective victi•
(Sec. 321-324a).

Both exceptions apply to the facts of this case.

In turning first to the special relationship part of the
pleadings, the court notes that a relationship of defendant
therapists to either Tatiana or Poddar will suffice to establish a
duty of care.

The court concludes that there is a relationship here

between the defendants and Poddar.

It is a relationship of the kind

that exists between a patient and his/her doctor.
The court also set some precedent here in saying that although
the California decisions that recognize duty have involved cases in
which the defendant stood in a special relationship both to the
victia and to the person whose conduct created the danger, that duty
should not be limited to such situations.

Such a strong requirement

precludes liability in valid cases concerning an important and
influential relationship.

The court looks to other jurisdictions to

decide that the single relationship of a doctor to his/her patient
is sufficient to support the duty to use reasonable care to warn of
dangers e•anating fro• the patient's illness.

The court decided

that a doctor or psychotherapist treating a aentally ill patient is
treating soaeone who presents a danger as serious and as foreseeable
as does the carrier of a contagious disease.
Next, the court also points out that Poddar broke off all
contact with the health center after his contact with the police.
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The plaintiffs assert that it aight be inferred that the defendants
aay have then acquired a duty in contributing to Poddar's
dangerousness.

Similarly, and along the sa•e lines, it was the

defendants' obligations to strive to continue servicing Poddar after
his having become a patient, and even after his having left therapy.
In defense of their position, the defendants advanced two
policy considerations for a refusal to iapose a duty upon
psychotherapists to warn third parties of danger arising from
violent intentions of a patient.

First of all, defendants point out

that therapy patients often express ideas of violence, but rarely
carry them out.

It is extremely difficult to ascertain those who

would be likely to carry out the threats.

Secondly, the defendants

argue that free and open communication is a crucial part of
psychotherapy and that a warning to a third party is a breach of
trust.
Responding to the first policy concern, the court answers that
the standard of care here is no •ore difficult to deteraine than
that standard for physicians or other professionals.

The court

deter•ines that although an individual psychotherapist's standard of
care may vary, the psychotherapist is still held to that general
standard "ordinarily possessed and exercised by •e•bers of [his]
profession under similar circu•stances" (Bardesono v. Michels
(1970)).

Replying to the second policy reason, the court says that

it acknowledges the public interest in confidential treat•ent, but
that the public interest in protection from assault aust also be
weighed.

It explains that the legislature has tried to balance the
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concerns through establishing a broad rule of privilege for patients
and psychotherapists (Evidence Code 1014).

The court also

indicates, however, that Evidence Code 1024 contains a limited
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege when the patient
is believed to be dangerous to himself or others.

The court

continues by stating that the revelation of such a co..unication is
not a breach of trust under the Medical Ethics of the

~erican

Medical Association (1957) Section 9, because as stated therein, a
physician is required to do so in order "to protect the welfare of
the individual or of the co1R11unity" (p. 347).

This court reverses

the judgment of the superior court, and determines that plaintiffs'
complaint can be amended to show a cause of action.
concludes:

The court

"The protective privilege ends where the public peril

begins" (p. 347).
In determining the second prong of the defense, the reliance on
the Torts Clai• Act of 1963, the court focuses on Section 820.2 of
the Government Code in order to determine whether public officials
are protected by governmental i ..unity as a result of their status
as public officials.

Through studying past cases, the court finds

that i•munity is given to those who exercise discretionary policy
decisions, not basic policy decisions.

The court says:

"We require

of publicly e•ployed therapists only that quantum of care which the
co•mon law requires of private therapists, that they use that
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and conscientiousness
ordinarily exercised by meabers of their profession" (p. 351).
Section 820.2 does not shield the therapists from liability for
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failure to warn.
The court does, however, sustain defendant therapists'
contention that Section 856 of the Govern•ent Code protects them
from liability for failing to confine Poddar, that failure
consisting the plaintiffs' first and fourth causes of action.
Section 856 determines liability only where the defendant has
failed, through act or omission, to carry out a determination to
confine or not to confine.

The court here finds, first of all, that

Dr. Powelson automatically fits within this exception because he
•ade a decision, and followed through with it.

It seems that he

cannot be charged with the intent to abandon a dangerous patient if
he. as director of the departaent, and superior to Dr. Moore, is
merely disagreeing with his subordinate's decision and following
through faithfully on his own deliberations.

Additionally, then,

Dr. Powelson is also exempt from the punitive damages for this
alleged failure, and plaintiff's third cause of action fails.
Dr. Moore's exercise of decision is •ore difficult to ascertain
because he initially differed with Powelson.

Nonetheless, the court

decided that Dr. Moore's action in not overturning Dr. Powelson's
decision was an act of compliance, and really a decision to go along
with Dr. Powelson.

Whether this coapliance was a result of clinical

reevaluation or an atte•pt to ingratiate himself at the health
center is unclear.

Dr. Moore did assert at trial that he was

obliged to obey the decision of his e•ployer.

Inforaation about

Powelson's order, the date of its issuance, and Powelson's authority
over Moore are not entirely discussed in the facts.

Thus, the first
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and fourth causes of action, referring to liability for failure to
detain the patients fail.
In regard to the police officers, the court consults Section
5154 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and finds that they are
i•mune from liability as are "peace officers," aentioned in the
code, "who are responsible for the detainaent of the person" (p.
353).

According to Goodman, author of "From Tarasoff to Hopper: The
Evolution of the Therapist's Duty to Protect Third Parties" (1985),
the holding in Tarasoff I, then, was sufficiently narrow.
a duty to warn only the potential victim.
were blocked by goverllllental iamunity.

There was

Other causes of action

There were background

histories for the two different bases used by the court for iaposing
the duty to warn.

First of all, the court relied on an article by

Fleaing and Maxi•ov (1974) entitled "The Patient or His Victia: The
Therapist's Dileama" to declare that the relationship which arises
between a patient and psychotherapist supports affiraative duties on
the part of the therapist for the benefit ot third parties.
Next, the court relied on extra-jurisdictional cases which
iaposed a duty to warn in order to find that the duty of the
therapist treating a person with violent tendencies was analogous to
the carrier of a contagious disease or the driver whose condition or
aedication affected his ability to drive safely.

These ideas were

based on policy judgments expressed in Richards v. Stanley (1954)
that, in such situations, the person aost likely to foresee or
prevent an injury should be held responsible for taking steps toward
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prevention.

Also, as already noted earlier, Good•an also indicates

that the Restateaent (Second) of Torts, Section 315, was first used
by the court in the 1974 decision to find the psychotherapistpatient relationship to be a "special relationship" and an exception
to the coa•on law rule that ffone person owed no duty to control the
conduct of another" (p. 557, citing Richards vs. Stanley 217 P. 2d
23 (1954)).
By 1976, the Allerican Psychiatric Association (APA), in
collaboration with other professional organizations, had filed an
aaicus curiae ("friend of the court") brief asking the Supreae Court
to rehear the appeal.
These professionals were worried that requiring therapists to
warn potential victias would lead to aany aore breaches of patients'
right to confidentiality.

They argued that given the isolated

instances of violence, aany predictions would be falsely positive.
Consequently, the aajority of these breaches would serve no purpose
other than to instill anxiety in the potential victia, and would,
coincidentally, undermine the patient's confidence in the therapist
and the therapeutic process.
Also, soae psychotherapists believed that they would be obliged
to alert patients routinely about the duty to warn.

They

anticipated the deleterious effect of telling a patient at beginning
of therapy that certain things the patient aight say could alert the
therapist to warn third parties.

They saw the negative effect such

a warning would have in preventing the patient froa disclosing
affect-laden fantasies, through process essential to accoaplishing
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the work of psychotherapy.

The APA's fervor was strong enough to

persuade the California Supre•e Court to rehear the case.
a second opinion was issued.

In 1976,

It is known as "Tarasoff II."

The court again held that a psychotherapist has a duty to the
potential victim but relied on Beck (1985), to define that duty •ore
broadly and with •ore breadth for professional judgment by the
therapist (p. 5).

The court said:

"The discharge of this duty may

require the therapist to take one or •ore of various steps depending
upon the nature of the case.

Thus, it •ay call for him to warn the

intended victi• or others likely to apprise the intended victim of
danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever steps are
reasonably necessary under the circumstances" (p. 340).

The second

opinion, then, •odified the duty to warn as defined in the first
Tarasoff opinion.
(p.

Beck (1985) saw the result as a duty to protect

5).
He also points out that the court's opinion was not unanimous:

only four of the seven judges concurred.

Judge Mosk agreed that

there was a cause of action because defendants did predict violence
and failed to warn.

He doubted that negligence would be found

because the defendants had notified the police.

He could not

concur, however, in the •ajority's rule that a therapist •ay be held
liable for failing to predict his patient's tendency to violence if
other practitioners, pursuant to the "standards of the profession,"
would have done so.
discern.

He finds that the standards are hard to

Psychiatrist predictions of violence are virtually

unreliable and may vary considerably from one professional to
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another.
In a separate dissent, Judge Clark agreed with the APA •e•bers
that the new duty would not increase public safety.

Clark said "the

majority fails to recognize that ... overwhel•ing policy
considerations •andate against sacrificing funda•ental patient
interests without gaining a corresponding increase in public
benefit" (p. 353).
Beck says that the second opinion is unclear because it does
not specify who is subject to the duty.

The case itself involved a

psychologist and a psychiatrist, but nothing was said about social
workers, nurse-therapists or counselors (p. 6).

Nor did the opinion

spell out the steps necessary to discharge the duty of protection.
Most i•portantly, the opinion left unanswered how the therapist is
to know when he/she should deter•ine. or how he/she should deter•ine
that his/her patient presents a danger of violence to another.
Similarly, according to Goodman (1985), Tarasoff II was the
vehicle through which the California Supreme Court dra•atically
•odified its earlier opinion.

Instead of imposing an absolute duty

to warn, the court in 1976 for•ulated a two-step analysis.

The

first step was whether the therapist, through the standards of
his/her profession, knew or should have known that the patient
presented a serious danger of violence to another and, secondly,
whether the therapist used reasonable care to protect the threatened
victi•.

Good•an also highlighted the fact that the court in 1976

expressed that the duty is •erely contingent on the circu•stances of
each case (p. 205).
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Goodman says that in both Tarasoff I and Tarasoff II, the
defense argued that the decisions in the cases. especially in the
latter, were unjust in placing a burden on the psychotherapist and
bis/her practice.

The strongest argument asserted that

psychiatrists and those in the •ental health professions could not
reliably predict potential future violence and dangerousness of
their clients.
The alternative assertion by the defense was that unnecessary
warnings would have a bad effect on patients through deterring them
from seeking therapy and eroding the therapist-patient relationship.
(This is similar to Judge Clark's dissent.)

The court used a

balancing test to weigh the public interest in treatment against the
public interest in safety fro• potential violence.

Thus, others

have asserted that another important exception to the common law
rule of "no duty" was born by the California Supreme Court.
According to Prosser (1971), "The problem of duty is as broad
as the whole of negligence ... and no universal test for it has ever
been formulated" (cited in Goodllan, p. 207).

Goodman relies on

Lowe's 1975 article "Tarasoff v. Regents of University of
California: Risk Allocation" to state that the arguments continue
about what factors should be weighed and who should weigh the•.

The

general rule that developed in common law and that was later
integrated into the second Restate•ent was that there is no duty to
control the conduct of another, or to warn those endangered.

This

idea is pre•ised on the com•on law distinction between aff ir•ative
•isconduct and passive inaction, •isfeasance and nonfeasance.

This
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represents the com•only-accepted principle that so long as a person
does nothing to interfere with another's interests, the law will not
require any affir•ative undertaking to protect a stranger.

Good•an

states that the court referred to Winterbottom v. Wright (1842), one
of the first cases to focus on precluding an infinite amount of
actions.

In Wright, •entioned in Chapter III of this thesis. a

third party to a sale contract of a defective mail coach and a
driver of that coach, could not collect da•ages for injury resultant
of using coach.

The govern•ent claiaed that the seller had no duty

to the third-party driver and to hold otherwise would •ake available
liability against anyone subsequently and re•otely connected with
the initial relationship.
Goodman asserts that in Tarasoff II, Judge Tobriner
dra•atically •edified both the duty required of the defendants and
the rationale behind it.

The opinion begins with a reference to

Heaven v. Pender's "fundamental principle" (1883).

As stated

earlier, this general principle was the very first interpretation of
a duty to protect others.

Judge Tobriner indicates, nonetheless,

that Aaerican courts soon retreated fro• this broad duty toward a
narrowing of the duty in 1934 with the Restateaent of Torts.

From

that ti•e on, Section 315 has been used on occasion to establish a
duty to control or to protect third persons, as well as a aeans to
deny liability.
Goodllan says in a footnote:

"The use of section 315 to i•pose

a duty to control or protect ... has been criticized because
explicitly Section 315 does not establish an affir•ative obligation

50

to undertake new actions, but only de•ands ... vigilance that
already has been undertaken" (p. 209, fn.7).

He further explains

that so•e have argued that as there is no capacity by therapists to
control outpatients, there should neither be a duty to protect
potential victi•s in these cases.
The court, in Tarasoff II, continues to find a "special
relationship" between the therapists and Poddar and still relies on
the reasoning in Tarasoff I.

In Tarasoff II, affirmative duties of

a •uch broader nature are established.

In using Pender's

"funda•ental principle" of care to others, the court apparently
arrives at an affir•ative duty based pri•arily upon the element of
foreseeability.

The second Tarasoff decision left •any questions

unanswered, one of the •ost i•portant referring to foreseeability.
Resolution of this was left for definition, restriction, and
extension in future holdings.
In his opinion, Murphy (1985), author of "Evolution of the Duty
of Care: So•e Thoughts," says that the holding in Tarasoff is really
consistent with Heaven v. Pender.

Nonetheless, he says that the

decision can be criticized because the duty e•anating from Section
315, and that which has been articulated and developed historically
in ter•s of control and protection, has a wider scope of operation
and demands a higher standard of care than that i•posed by the
general rule requiring the exercise of due care.

More i•portantly,

according to Murphy, Section 315 requires al•ost a fiduciary or
confidential relationship.

Murphy su••arizes by saying that all of

the relationships in Topic 7 of the Restatement and Section 315 have
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something in coaaon.

Si•ply put, it is the fact that relationships,

despite tort principles, have historically been defined in terms of
the duty to protect or control.

Using negligence principles, it

seems that the attach•ent of a duty to exercise reasonable care with
regard to one standing in a particular relationship is sufficient
once that relationship entailing the duty is established.
According to Murphy, the Restate•ent analyzes the duty by
showing its two divisions.

It is to protect, in one class of

relations, and to control in another.

The general require•ent under

negligence principles is to be prudent or to use reasonable care.
Under the Restatement, protection or control in itself is the object
of the duties particularized in Sections 314 through 320 and
abstracted in Section 315.
Murphy feels that the phrase "to use reasonable care" is very
broad.

In this way, it is helpful because it is wide and flexible

enough to encompass a full range of huaan activities.

It lacks a

level of specificity "that would channel one's conceived and
executory actions into routes previously designated to require the
exercise of care" (p. 170).

For exa•ple, the exercise of reasonable

care •ay at so•e times go well beyond taking efforts to protect or
to control.

In another case, however, the exercise of reasonable

care might require less than one or aore of a cluster of acts
explicable in terms of protection or control.
Murphy points out that the problem with the words "protect" and
"control" is that they are two-sided: They come close to suggesting.
but do not demand, a duty to do acts reasonably connected with the
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end to be achieved, even if these acts be at one's peril.

Murphy

indicates that analysis of the special relationship •entioned in
Restate•ent sections 314-320 shows that the group representing "duty
to protect" are undertakings, circuastances which require •ore than
reasonable care but something less than absolute liability.

An

exa•ple given is an innkeeper who undertakes to protect guests and
not just use reasonable care in regard to the latter's safety.
This obligation is not absolute liability, but it does require
so•ething •ore than reasonable care.

What is required is a kind of

vigilance "cognate at least with the vigilance that Cardozo spoke of
in MacPherson v. Buick" (p. 171).

But there is an i•portant

difference for Murphy: The vigilance of the innkeeper is directly
associated with the nature of the undertaking.

He or she

voluntarily assu•ed the responsibility to be careful for the guest.
MacPherson is different because the obligation there is imposed by
the law: it is a further extension of the standard of care.
Murphy explains that in both groups of relationships, the duty
is a result of an already existing control or an already existing
protection.

Different than MacPherson which stresses an affir•ative

obligation to do new and positive acts, the duty herein being
discussed de•ands only the continuous vigilance that has already
been undertaken by choice or iaposed with the acquiescence or
knowledge of the burdened party.
Tarasoff is a result of the probleas in these contradictory
ideas of duty found in Section 315.

Murphy explains that initially,

in Tarasoff I, the California Supre•e Court held that when a
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psychotherapist deter•ines or ought to deter•ine that a warning to
another is necessary to avert danger from his/her patient, he or she
incurs a legal obligation to give that warning.

The court found

that the relationship itself i•posed a duty to warn.

Apparently,

the court derived this duty to warn fro• both the special
relationship of Section 315 and the fundamental principle of
Rowland.

As a result of this rule, the psychotherapist was now

obligated to warn almost at his or her peril.

The only consolation

for the psychotherapist was that the duty was siaply to warn and not
to carry out any other numerous, thoughtful actions.

Murphy says

that in following Section 315 to its logical conclusion, the court
implicitly de•onstrated its inapplicability.
Murphy further explains that Tarasoff II, decided two years
later, vacated the earlier opinion.

The court still confessed to

use the "special relationship" and "the fundamental principle"
analysis, but now reasoned that the discharge of the duty required
the psychotherapist to take one or
the nature of the situation.

ao~e

various steps depending on

The duty was one of reasonable care.

Murphy says that the court had aade a reaarkable, though
unexpressed, shift.

Duty of the psychotherapist was now put

seeaingly where it belonged, in the funda•ental principle and its
precedents.
Murphy wishes to show the irony of bringing Section 315 of the
Restateaent to the forefront and •a.king it one of the aore active
areas of tort law.

In this way, Tarasoff foreshadows the failure of

the special relationship analysis, "or at the very least portends
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for it a contraction into its for•er, narrow boundaries" (p. 173).
Because of Tarasoff II, Murphy says that other courts have begun to
discover the discrepancies in Section 315.
The result of the Tarasoff cases, according to Murphy, is that
courts relying on Section 315 May be reluctant, or even unable, to
i•pose liability in newly eaerging and socially sensitive fact
situations.

There are three reasons: 1) Section 315 requires the

equivalent of a fiduciary relationship, 2) When courts choose to
impose liability, they •ay find that it results in a loose and illdefined standard of care (including a warning or other preconceived
act) which in any given case •ay either fall short of, or actually
exceed, a standard of reasonableness, and 3) Finally, courts wishing
to deny liability will find that the principles eabodied in Section
315 are a convenient and plausible device.
Murphy says that a preferable approach in Tarasof f would have
been Sias' dissent that found a direct relationship between the
victim and the defendants.

That is to say that Si•s would have

e•ployed the fundaaental principle to find a duty to exercise
reasonable care without invoking Section 315.
According to Murphy, the significance of Tarasoff is that it
see•s to have ''engrafted" the special relationship concept onto the
funda•ental principle.

"The result can only be to retard the final

establishaent of a concept of duty uni•peded by privity or the
•isfeasance-nonfeasance dichoto•y" (p. 175).

He thinks that new

duties will develop not fro• the "special relationship'' of Section
315, but from the larger proposition of Heaven v. Pender.

Murphy
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says that courts are now trying to use the language of Section 315.
Nonetheless, the language there will not prevent a court fro• using
a larger principle analysis when nothing in Section 315 works:
Murphy concludes:
Although the relations that may give rise to a duty of care are
infinite in nuaber, the aost that the foreseeability test
requires is that one exercise reasonable care, a reasonable
care founded not in the intricacies of privity or the
aetaphysics of action-inaction variation, but in ethics-that
people exercise the saae reasonable care towards others that
they expect others to exercise towards them (p. 178).

CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF TARASOFF ON CALIFORNIA
It is difficult to neatly organize and categorize the cases
that were later decided in reaction to Tarasoff.

As the Tarasoff

decision beca•e standard law in California, its theory began to be
applicable to crimes other than murder.

Despite its use. courts

were still unclear, however, as to how to interpret the final
holding.

A 1980 California court even seeaed to drastically narrow

the therapists' responsibilities in Thoapson v. County of Alaaeda,
where the court held that duty to warn only exists when there is an
identifiable victi•.

(Thoapson is discussed later in this chapter.)

Problems were coapounded as Tarasoff decisions spread to other
states, and state courts subsequently used each other for reference
to the original ruling.
Perhaps what is •ost interesting about the Tarasoff history is
the i•aediate i•pact that these California state decisions had in
courts throughout the country.

Although the subsequent Brady v.

Hopper case aay have gained •ore publicity for this area of law, it
nonetheless was only a repercussion of the unique controversies
initially set forth in Tarasoff.
Perhaps it is •ost logical to first examine the transforaations
within the state of California itself.

Following Tarasoff, Bellah

v. Greenson (1977) was one of the first California cases to be
56
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decided with regard to Tarasoff.

Greenson concerned a psychiatrist

who did not warn the parents of a deceased patient that their
daughter had suicidal tendencies.

The psychiatrist also failed to

prevent the daughter fro• aeeting with heroin addicts.

The

California Appellate Court held that the psychiatrist could not be
held liable and refused to extend the Tarasoff duty to preclude
self-inflicted harm or even property damage.

In regard to the

allegation of failure to restrain, the court determined that there
can be no liability absent risk of violent assault.
interpreted as the probability of violence occurring.

Risk might be
It could be

aeasured by the presence or absence of coaaon violence predictors
such as the articulation of a specific threat and the ability to
carry it out.
In his article "Therapist Liability and Patient
Confidentiality" (1986), Willia• J. Winslade said that the Bellah
case proved the court's high reeard for confidentiality in cases not
involving harm to others.

He points out that even the Tarasoff

opinion recognizes the authority of section 5328 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code, which requires that the therapeutic
conversations with psychotherapists be kept confidential.

He

comaents that the Tarasoff opinion is held only in instances not
governed by statutory confidentiality rules.
Two years later, in 1979, the California Appellate Court again
held defendant doctors illllune to liability for death occurring after
a failure to "confine" a •entally 111 person.

In McDowell v. County

of Alaaeda, the patient was diagnosed as aentally ill and sent by
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taxi to a hospital.

The patient, however. never arrived at the

hospital and subsequently killed the victi•.

The court justified

its decision by finding the case different than Tarasoff on two
grounds:

First of all, there was no relationship between either the

defendants and the victi•. nor the patient and the victi•.
Secondly, there was no foreseeable victim.
During the following year, 1980, Mavroudis v. Superior Court
for County of San Mateo reiterated the basic Tarasoff holding
together with an indication of the type of danger that aust be
disclosed to the identifiable victim.

Mavroudis concerned

allegations brought against a hospital by parents who had been
attacked by their son, a aental patient in the hospital.
parents wanted the son's psychiatric records released.

The
Much

criticis• has been •ade of this case due to the court's choice for
the private review of the records to deteraine whether the therapist
knew or should have known that the son presented a serious
propensity for violence.

The court wrote that the confidentiality

owed to a psychiatric patient should not be broken unless the
disclosure would preclude leaving others in peril.
considered is the probability of violence.

What is to be

Winslade explains that

this case shows the struggle between judicial interpretation (of
cases such as Tarasoff) requesting a duty to warn and statutory law
(such as Section 5328 of the California Welfare Code) which
prohibits disclosure of therapeutic information.

The exception to

disclosure only in the event of possible danger to another is the
co..on ground in trying to satisfy both requireaents until, as

•
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Winslade suggests, the courts or legislatures •ove to •ake either
superseding in authority.
Winslade uses this case to •ake hypotheses about future
conflicts between Tarasoff and Section 5328.

He says:

In its 1980 decision in Mavroudis v. Superior Court, a
California Court of Appeals recognized that Section 5328 does
not per•it disclosure of confidential records. It did ad•it,
however, an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
in the presence of conditions evoking the Tarasoff duty-under
Evidence Code Section 1024 .... On that basis, the Mavroudis
court ruled that psychiatric records could be obtained by
parties to a suit, in pretrial discovery if the judge exaained
the records in chambers and found that the conditions described
in Evidence Code Section 1024 were present and that there was a
readily identifiable victi• before the ti•e of the incident"
(pp. 211-212).
Winslade explained that the actual iaplications of Mavroudis
•ight not be readily apparent to therapists and lawyers alike.

He

said that the court's opinion suggests that a party will be allowed
to bring suit against an institution covered by Section 5328 for
negligence of the Tarasoff duty and that institutions thought to be
protected by Section 5328 •ay not, in fact, be shielded by those
statutes.
Mavroudis:

Winslade purports two additional ramifications due to
1) Confidentiality is probably not protected by

different statutes, similar to California's Section 5328 in a
Tarasoff situation.

2) Confidentiality and privacy are further

•itigated by the judge's private, pretrial examination of the
therapists' records and the possible release of those records to
litigants.
Winslade suggests that only selected, on point portions of the
records should be •ade available to the court.

He says:

These •atters go beyond the original concern of breaching
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confidentiality to warn a victi•. Confidentiality •ay now be
breached to further a lawsuit alleging liability of a therapist
as opposed to the conduct or potential conduct of the patient
involved. Jus.t how •uch statutory protection of
psychotherapist-patient confidentiality still exists in the
Tarasoff context remains unclear, because the Mavroudis opinion
addresses this question only insofar as it allows litigants
pretrial access to privileged infor•ation (p. 212).
During that sa•e year, Tho•pson v. County of Ala•eda was
decided by the California Supre•e Court and drastically changed the
Tarasoff holding.

Justice Richardson, writing for the aajority,

restricted the duty to protect others.

The new warning extended

only to a specific threat to a specific, identifiable victi•.
Tho•pson concerned a clai• against Ala•eda County for
negligently releasing a juvenile delinquent who killed the
plaintiff's son.

What is especially important to note in Thompson

is that the court was dealing with a county having custody over a
juvenile delinquent and not with a hospital nor therapist.

What

influenced the court's decision were policy considerations
respecting the hardship that •ight be placed upon the State in
perforaing parole and probation decisions.

The dissent here

included Justices Tobriner and Mosk who contended that the •ajority
had •isread the precedent cases which included Tarasoff.

Justice

Tobriner argued that the Tarasoff duty was not liaited to only a
warning to a specific victi•.

He clarified that Tarasoff did not

aean that failure to warn a victi• who is identifiable is a required
criterion for a lawsuit.

Rather, taking necessary steps •ay or •ay

not include warning that victia.

It aay also include notifying the

police or those likely to warn the victia theaselves.
The article entitled "Tarasoff duty to warn discussed in three
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cases: no such duty found in Maryland" (Mental and Physical
pisabilities Law Reporter, 1980. Sept./Oct.) refers to Thoapson and
argues that the decision to release the patient in Tho•pson was
viewed as a govern.11ental function having illlllunity under California
Govern•ent Code Sections 820.2 and 845.8.

It states that the focal

point of the controversy in the case was whether the county had a
duty to warn the local police, neighborhood if released.

The court

looked to Tarasoff and Johnson v. California (1968), and
subsequently held that the child ultiaately •urdered was not an
identifiable victi•.

In regard to the issuance of general warnings,

the court said that these would be i•practical and that such warning
aight undermine the constructive purposes of the parole and
probation systea by indirectly labeling the released as dangerous to
society.

The article further states that warning the •other-

custodian would not have been worthwhile as she knew of the
patient's 18-•onth detain•ent.

It would not have been conducive to

release procedures to expect her to have constant supervision.
Finally, the aother had no special relationship with the defendants.
The dissent in this case argued that the •other should have
been warned since the Tarasoff opinion did not eaphasize
identifiable victi•s.

Rather, the essence of the Tarasoff ruling

was that special relationships, whether these be between a therapist
and a patient or, in this case, a state and its prisoner, are
powerful in and of theaselves.

The relationship allows the

therapist or state a unique opportunity to closely observe the
person whose capacity for violence is questioned.
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Winslade says:
Tho•pson speaks to the validity of the state's purposes as they
are 'rational policies.' A parallel, however, aight be drawn
between parole as a rationale policy with respect to successful
cri•inal rehabilitation and confidentiality as a rational
policy with respect to successful psychotherapy (itself a kind
of rehabilitation). If the parallel is accurate, then it
follows that i . .unity should also be granted to those who honor
confidentiality in the pursuit of successful therapy, even if
success is not any more guaranteed than it is in cri•inal
rehabilitation (p. 215).
About that time, Buford v. California was decided by the
California Court of Appeals.

Here. plaintiff was assaulted and

raped by patient on leave froa the hospital.

The plaintiff argued

that the state, and its employees, had failed to correctly diagnose
and treat the patient.

The court of appeals held that the state did

have a special relationship to the patient because priaarily, he was
still a mental patient in spite of "leave" peraission and secondly,
he still expected assistance in rehabilitation.

The court also

found that the problem lay not in the discretionary decision •ade by
the state to give a leave of absence.

Discretionary functions are

those that include a weighing of policy considerations.

Winslade

exeaplifies this arguaent by saying that the develop•ent of
goverruaent regulations is a discretionary function.

Goverruaent

bodies are protected fro• liability for discretionary functions
through statutory provisions, such as the California Governaent
Code, Section 856.

Thus, in Buford, the decision to release a

•ental patient is discretionary because it concerns consideration as
to whether the public policy, favoring rehabilitation, outweighs
that of continued detention.

The governaental body, then, would be

protected for its decision to release.
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"Ministerial" actions, however, are of a different type.

These

are tasks perfor•ed usually by personnel, under direction. according
to orders, without discretion as to those actions.

These are acts

perfor•ed or omitted by the hospital after the grant of leave was
per•itted.

Winslade points out that the appellate court left to the

triers of fact, the jury, the question of whether or not the
therapeutic/rehabilitative personnel at the hospital had correctly
performed their '•inisterial' duties in releasing Buford into
society.
In reference to Tarasoff, Winslade argues that a failure to
protect a potential victim would be a failure to perfor• a
•inisterial duty.

He presents the demarcations •ade by statutes

between discretionary decisions and decisions concerning follow-up,
•inisterial tasks.

In Slllmling up, Winslade says:

Ministerial actions in Buford see• to be co•parable to the
therapist's position in Tarasoff-type cases, insofar as each is
liable for actions, or failures to act, to prevent harm. It is
not clear fro• the discussions whether the court is concerned
with actual distinctions between •inisterial and discretionary
functions or whether it is trying to deter•ine differing
standards that would constitute negligence in the two for•s
(pp. 216-217).
He notes that cases like Thoapson and Buford suggest that
liability is dependent upon decisions co•patible with professional
standards and in response to so•e rational state policy, rather than
with the presence/absence of an identifiable victi•.

Finally, he

purports that auch i ..unity •akes wealthy institutions •ore
attractive as defendant• than private practitioners.
During the following year, Me2eff v. Doland brought under
scrutiny the issue concerning the therapist's duty to control
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patients, either

hospitali~ed

or outpatients.

In Megeff, the

plaintiffs were the wife and daughter of an 87-year-old •an who
attacked the• upon his release fro• a hospital.

This •an had

demonstrated aggressive behavior while hospitalized for a cardiac
condition.

The plaintiffs alleged that the hospital did not

adequately exercise sufficient control over a violent person and
used Tarasoff and Section 319 of Restateaent (Second) of Torts to
construct a duty to control.

The court, however, did not find a

duty to control based on absence of defendant's ability to do so.
Consequently, the ability of a psychotherapist to control either a
voluntary outpatient or a voluntary inpatient would bring into light
the issue of the duty of the therapist to control such a patient by
any aeans other than involuntary co••itment.
In the next year, the District Court of California, Central
Division heard Doyle v. U.S.A. (1982).

This was an action for the

wrongful death of a college security guard.

It was brought under

the Federal Tort Claias Act and was based on negligence of an Aray
psychiatrist who discharged a 19-year-old serviceaan n8.Jlled Carson.
Two days after release, the serviceaan killed a security guard.
This case concerned a conflict of laws between the states of
California and Louisiana.

Louisiana law was held applicable.

Under

the law of this state, the ar•y psychiatrists did not have to warn
the college guard killed by the serviceaan of the serviceaan's
ho•icidal intent in that the service•an never told his psychiatrist
nor any counselor who interviewed hi• of his intention to kill the
security guard who patrolled a nearby caapus.

Additionally, the
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court sur•ised that even if California law could be used in this
case. there would be no duty to warn of serviceaan's homicidal
intent because there was no foreseeable victi•.

The court cited

California's McDowell v. County of Alameda (1979) to show that under
California law, the defendant owed no duty of care to a ae•ber of
the general public such as Mr. Doyle.
One year later, in Vu v. Singer (1983), the U.S. Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals followed the earlier and revolutionary ruling of
Thompson in finding that, under California law, the victi• •ust be
foreseeable and specifically identifiable in duty to warn and
control cases.

Vu concerned residents being attacked by Job Corps

•embers working at a neighborhood Job Corps center.

In a concurring

opinion, Judge Rothstein agreed that under California law, Thompson
•ust be followed, but questioned Thompson's view of foreseeability.
She 'acknowledged Justice Tobriner's dissent in Tho•pson and further
co..ented on the confusion between the existence of a duty of care
(warn or control) with the question of an identifiable victim.

She

wrote:
As recognized by Justice Tobriner in Tho•pson, the
consideration of whether the Vus are 'identifiable victias' is
relevant not to the existence of a duty of care. but only to
the question whether a warning to the Vus •ight have been a
reasonable •eans to discharge that duty .... The application of
such a requireaent here to a duty of control follows logically
fro• Thoapson, but nonetheless co•pounds the Tho•pson's court's
error in reasoning because it per•its a '•eans' consideration
to dictate the existence of a duty of care (p. 1032).
What Judge Rothstein see•s to be saying is that the ability to
•ake a warning to identifiable victi•s does not constitute the duty
to warn, but re•ains only a •easure•ent as to whether the duty, the
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existence of which is established separately, has been reasonably
aet.

In short, recognition of the ability to warn does not signify

that there is an actual duty to warn in the particular circumstance.
During that same year, Jablonski v. United States was decided
by the United States Ninth Circuit Court who again relied on the
issue of the Tarasoff duty to warn.

The defendants were Veterans

Ad•inistration psychiatrists who were found negligent for their
failure to record and transmit inforaation, for failure to obtain
past medical records indicating that the patient was likely to
direct his violence against the victi•. and for failure to warn the
victi•.

(Winslade co••ented that there was recklessness, in

addition to negligence.)
Jablonski concerned a case in which the dangerous patient
underwent psychiatric examination after atte•pting to rape his
lover's mother.

The V.A. psychiatrist concluded through his

diagnosis that Jablonski had antisocial characteristics and a
tendency to be dangerous.

He was not committed and refused

voluntary hospitalization despite his past filled with violence at
other Veterans Administration facilities.

The psychiatrists advised

the patient's girlfriend to leave Jablonski.
complied.

She eventually

Upon visiting him at their for•er apart•ent, however, she

was killed by him.

The court held that if the psychiatrists had

appropriate relevant inforaation, then violence against the victim
would have been foreseeable.

The court felt that the facts of the

case fit so•ewhere between Tarasoff and Thompson in having an
unidentified but potentially ascertainable victia.
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Finally, in the sa•e year, 1983, the California Supre•e Court
aade a substantial aodification of the Thoapson decision to Hedlund
v. Superior Court of Orange County.

This was the first aajor

decision affecting the duty to warn since the severe "identifiable
victi•" test of Thoapson.

Here, the Supreae Court deterained that a

therapist who is negligent in aeeting his/her duty to warn an
identifiable potential victia that another has threatened violence
aay be responsible not only to the person threatened but also to
third parties who aay be haraed if the threat •ateriali2es.
In this case. the plaintiff was the victim's four-year-old son
who sat next to his •other in their car when she was shot by the
patient of the two defendant psychologists.

The suit here was only

for eaotional da•ages, not physical hara to the son.

The court

showed that it would recognize a duty in future cases not only to
children, but also to others in close relationships to the
threatened victia and even to soae bystanders.

Consequently, in

California, the duty to warn has been extended to foreseeable
persons in a close relationship to the specifically-threatened
victia.

It is interesting to note that Thoapson, which holds to the

contrary, is not aentioned in the Hedlund opinion.

Because of this,

the extent to which new decisions are binding is questionable.

At

least in the case of Hedlund, the court was not concerned in
changing or building upon precedent in order to further a resolution
of the legal dileaaa in Tarasotf.
Beck (1985) says of Hedlund that the California court found
that negligent failure to ascertain dangerousness in a Tarasoff case
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is as much grounds for liability as is the negligent failure to warn
victi•s after the deter•ination has been aade.

He clarifies that

where there is a negligent failure to warn, the duty •BY be owed to
any who are foreseeably threatened.
The dissent in Hedlund argued that the •ajority opinion
furthers the incorrect belief that psychiatrists and psychologists
have extraordinary perception and are able to predict violence
better than others.

Dissenters argued for si•ple negligence, not

•alpractice toward defendants. because the failure to warn happened
after knowledge or treataent.

Beck says that this is an incorrect

view because a professional, not a civil, judgaent is used.

He adds

that aany different standard have been used to evaluate
dangerousness and that this iaplies that there really is no factual
basis for diagnosing it.

Beck says that i•posing potential

liability on therapists creates an injustice for therapists by
holding the• responsible for injuries to people other than the
victi•.
In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled on an
action brought against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claias Act for the wrongful death of a sect aeaber.

in Grunnet v.

United States (1984), the U.S. District Court had dismissed the
action, and the plaintiff, decedent's •other, appealed.

The court

of appeals held that the U.S. was iaaune fro• suit under the Act's
foreign country and discretionary exceptions.

This was an incident

related to the Jonestown tragedy where the failure to warn the
victim occurred in Guyana and is an exception to the jurisdiction of
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the FTCA.

However, the other failures to warn others (relatives) of

the danger that the People's Temple posed, happened within the
United States.

In order to make a negligence suit in the United

States, Grunnet would have had to have shown that the U.S., as a
private person, breached a duty owed to her.

Since the failure to

warn Grunnet happened in California, California law would apply.
Because there was no special relationship here, the judgaent was
affiraed.
In 1985, a bill to reduce therapist responsibility was
introduced in the California Legislature by the California
Psychological Association.

It was explained in the Nove•ber 1985

issue of the APA Monitor (p. 24).

The author said that the

Association had been successful in its support of a proposal that
exe•pted psychotherapists from liability for failure to warn and
protect "except where the patient has couunicated to the
psychotherapist a serious threat of violence against a reasonably
identifiable victim" (p. 24).
Although the bill passed both legislative houses, Governor
George Deukmejian did not sign it because he feared that liaiting
the duty would present more danger to the public (Mental and
Physical Disabilities Law Reporter, 1985, p. 77).

It was said in

the article that the •ajor adversaries to the bill were state trial
lawyer associations because lawyers see therapists as the "bad guys"
(p. 24), and seek to collect in lawsuits against therapists.
Rogers Wright, past president of the state association,
appeared in the •edia as a representative for psychology.

He said:

70
"Self-proclaiaed experts who aake public predictions about what
people will do in the future, or speculate about what the soaeone
was thinking at soae point in the past, have led the public to
believe that psychologists can predict dangerousness" (p. 24).
Wright ad•itted that the bill does not represent "a good law, but
the best under the circu•stances."

He added that such advances "may

allow us to practice until the aadness passes, until it's realized
that we're not godlike but siaply people involved with other people
in a learning process called psychotherapy" (p. 24).
As a result of Tarasoff, aany studies were conducted to assess
the impact of its second decision.

As early as May 2. 1977, an

article entitled "A Growing Proble• for Researchers: Protecting
Privacy," by Cheryl Fields appeared in The Chronicle of Higher
Education (cited in Behavior Today, May 16, 1977, p. 1).

Her work

describes a study of the issues of confidentiality in research work
pursued by Professor Jaaes D. Carroll of Syracuse University.
Carroll learned through his study that soae legal iaaunity is
crucial to protect behavioral researchers fro• having their
docu•ents subpoenaed by the govern•ent.

Carroll testified before

the Congressional Privacy Protection Study co.. ission which is
constituted for facilitation of changes in the federal Privacy Act
of 1974.

Carroll presented the following findings:

1) More than 7%

of the respondents (behavioral researchers) spoke of a proble• of
confidentiality in their research.
were issued in 17 of the cases.

2) In the above 7%, subpoenas

In 26 other cases, "substantial

government deaands (were) aade upon researchers through judicial,
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legislative, and adainistrative bodies" (p. 2).

3) Twenty of the 47

incidents concerning important problems of confidentiality involved
research possibly leading to "an iaaediate public-policy issue"
which was not further clarified in the article (p. 2).
Siailarly, the Match 1979 issue of Behavior Today describes an
article by San Francisco attorney Toni Pryor Wise, who has shown
that "nine out of ten California psychotherapists have significantly
aodified their practices as a result of the decision-and in
decisions that aay be less than optiaal for their patients" (p. 1).
Wise herself states in the described Stanford Law Review article
that the aost draaatic change in California is the "heightened
anxiety aany therapists now feel in any clinical situations in which
the potential violence of a patient becoaes an issue or in which the
prospect of a duty to warn arises" (cited in Behavior Today, March
1979, p. 1).

Wise reported that as aany as a sixth of all the

psychologists who answered her survey noted that they wished to
avoid exploring areas as potential hoaicidal iapulses in their work
with patients.

Many respondents said that they now turned down

clients who seeaed prone to violence.

Soae psychotherapists told

Wise that they were now aore willing to coamit a patient who seemed
dangerous to a third party.
Wise argues that the treataent of aental health problems aay be
weakened by therapists' uneasiness.

She said that about

25~

of the

patients were cautious in discussing violent tendencies when they
discovered that their therapist aight breach their confidences.
also pointed out that Tarasoff aay have exacerbated an already

She
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prevalent willingness to overpredict dangerousness.

Wise found

proof that warnings to f81lily ae•bers, police, and potential victias
had been coaaon practice aaong California therapists even before
Tarasoff.

In fact. she reported that alaost one-half of her

respondents adaitted that they had given these kind of warnings,
often to aore than one individual during a single occurrence.
Wise thinks that her study has revealed "that iaposing on the
therapists a legal duty to warn, as opposed to the traditionally
discretionary professional duty, has had potentially detriaental
effects on psychotherapy" (pp. l-2).

She coaments that "courts and

legislatures aust decide if the uncertain increase in public safety
due to Tarasoff outweighs such potentially serious detriments to the
practice of psychotherapy" (p. 2).
According to Behavior Today, Wise's survey included statelicensed psychologists and aeabers of the California Psychiatric
Association.

Response rates were 34% and 35% respectively.

Also,

88% of her respondents reported soae clinical effects as a result of
Tarasoff.
Givelber. Bowers, and Blitch ("The Tarasoff Controversy:

A

Suaaary of Findings Proa an Bapirical Study of Legal, Ethical, and
Clinical Issues," 1985) describe a study done on psychotherapists
post-Tarasoff.

Their article is coaprised of a nuaber of conclusory

stateaents with ensuing explanations.

An effort here is made to

suaaarize the aain findings concisely for the purposes of this
thesis.
Perhaps their stateaents can be reorganized into three groups,
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each representing a unique conclusion:

(a) the identification of

the case, (b) the effect on therapists' practices, and (c) the
relevant discrepancies between California practitioners and those
fro• out of the state.

Jn the first category, researchers found

that the Tarasoff case is well-known and understood as applicable
when either therapists assess a patient as potentially violent or,
as reasonable therapists, believe that they should have arrived at a
positive prediction of dangerousness in a given case.

On the other

hand, •ost therapists (75%) •istakenly believe that Tarasoff 's real
thrust is a duty to warn likely victi•s, rather than a
responsibility to exercise reasonable care.

Most of the

practitioners believe themselves to be at least ethically bound to
follow the Tarasoff decision.
Jn terms of the second category, therapists have not readily
adopted a defense of being incapable of predicting dangerousness.
The study shows that over 75% of those surveyed believed that they
could •ake at least a "probable" prediction as to the dangerousness
of an individual.

Only 5% see•ed to think that such a prediction

was i•possible.
The study revealed that a variety of •ental health
practitioners rely on the sa•e criteria for predicting
dangerousness.

These include:

violent histories, hostile behavior,

abnor•al cognitive or e•otional states, stressful environ•ents and
psychotic diagnoses.

Despite this recognition of violent behavior,

therapists atill are not likely to warn a victi•.
in only about

15~

This will occur

of all cases, and it •ay be connected to specific
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verbal threats identifying the victia.

In any case, the authors

state that warning a victim is almost always accoapanied by some
other action by the therapist.

For exaaple, in addition to the

warning, treatment and documentation transpire in 80% of the cases.
In alaost three-fourths of these cases, the therapist atteapted to
alert someone other than the victi•. such as a friend or family.
The article stated that two possible reasons for this kind of action
is the disclosure by patient of intended victim or just the aere
likelihood that an unnaaed, potential victi• is known well by the
patient.
There were soae notable differences revealed between California
psychotherapists and therapists fro• other states.

In teras of

knowledge of the case, al•ost every Californian psychiatrist (96%)
and the aajority of Californian psychologists and social workers
(90%) had heard of the Tarasoff decision or so•ething resembling it.
Outside of California, 87% of psychiatrists bad heard of the case by
na•e and 7% of soaetbing like it.

Siailarly, al•ost 75% of out-of-

state psychologists and aore than half of non-Californian social
workers knew soaething about it.
Also. in assessing the duty, Californians are 70% aore apt to
think that warning alone satisfies a Tarasoff duty.

Psychiatrists

outside of California are 10% aore likely than their fellow
psychologists and social workers to believe the same.

Thus,

psychiatrists in general are aore likely to aisinterpret the
holding.
Finally, Californians are •ore likely to react to a verbal

75

threat with a warning to potential victi•s than are therapists fro•
out of the state.

The study reveals that each group of •ental

health professionals in California is •ore likely to warn those in
other states.

For exa.11ple, California psychiatrists are 11% •ore

likely to warn, psychologists are 5% •ore likely to warn, and social
workers are 20% •ore likely to warn.
California's response to Tarasoff stirred controversy in the
courts and caused California therapists to be •ore aware of their
liabilities.
confusing.

From its inception, the Tarasoff decision was
The rehearing to clarify its ramifications only confused

the APA further.

Nonetheless, perhaps the atteapt to redefine the

duty was a necessary step in exploring, for the first ti•e, the
legal para•eters of •ental health practitioners' legal
responsibilities.

The fact that the courts were inexperienced in

ruling on this subject is evidenced in the varying holdings within
the state itself, especially in the discrepancy between the Tho•pson
and Hedlund opinions.

Nonetheless, it •ay be reassuring that the

surveys done showed a •ajority of therapists within the state aware
of the decision and considering the effect on their own work.

It

seems impossible that the courts could for•ulate a proper holding on
the duty to warn using only legal theories.

The furor over the

Tarasoff decision caused therapists, and counsel for therapists, to
examine the duty fro• a therapeutic standpoint.

Perhaps it was

California's intensity, including its courts' confusion, that was
needed for perpetuating a national focus on this aspect of •ental
health and law.

CHAPTER VI
FEDERAL AND STATE CASES FURTHERING TARASOFF
As evidenced in these studies. there is great dispersion of the
Tarasoff decision throughout the country.

Many scholars and legal

researchers have atteapted to exaaine the effects in case law among
the states.

What follows are the •ost well-known ra•ifications of

the Tarasoff decision and its progeny outside of California during
the ten years following Tarasoff.

As would be predicted, state

courts differ with each other and federal courts often look to the
law of the state courts involved in their suits for so•e direction.
For purposes of organization only, both state and federal decisions
throughout the country will be grouped according to the judicial
districts aeant for federal courts of appeal.

For the purposes of

this thesis, e•phasis is on the federal decisions considering the
duty to warn.

However, in federal circuits having no relevant

federal case, state cases will be supple•ented in order to add to
the understanding of that geographical area's disposition on the
issue.
Lipari v. Sears Roebuck and Co. (1980) is herein discussed by
itself as other courts refer to it in •aking their decision.
Lipari was a Nebraska suit filed in the eighth Judicial Circuit
in 1980.

It concerned a •ental patient under outpatient treataent

at a Veterans Adainistration hospital.
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He purchased a gun froa
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Sears which he later used to fire into a crowded roo• at a
nightclub.

The plaintiffs sustained that the VA therapists knew or

should have known that the patient was dangerous to hi•self and
others.

Consequently, the plaintiffs purported that therapists had

a duty to detain or involuntarily co••it hi•.

The identity of the

victi•s was re•ote, but the court refused to li•it the therapists'
liability only to identifiable victims, thus expanding the li•iting
requirements of identifiability of the Tho•pson decision.

Lipari's

influence will be •entioned in cases that follow.
Proceeding in a chronological order, then, reference is first
made to those cases in the first judicial circuit.

The states in

this circuit are Maine, Massachusetts, New Hallpshire. and Rhode
Island.

In 1982, the Massachusetts Supre•e Court decided

Commonwealth v. Prendergast.

The court here discussed Tarasoff

during this •urder case. where the defendant had pleaded insanity to
killing his girlfriend.

In a footnote referring to Tarasoff, the

court said that it was unfortunate that the patient had not
co.. itted himself involuntarily or that potential victi•s were not
warned, in light of the fact that the patient's records revealed
that he was potentially dangerous.

Inference is •ade of the real

necessity so•eti•es in leaning in the direction of warning an
individual, rather than •aintaining the privileee statutes.
Three years later, in 1985, Gil•ore v. Buckley was filed in the
Massachusetts division of the federal district court.

The plaintiff

appealed and the court of appeals for this circuit heard the case in
1986.

The case concerned an adainistration of the estate of a·wo•an
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who was •urdered by an in•ate on furlough.

The administrator

brought a civil rights action against the county, the sheriff, the
county commissioners, the superintendent of the jail. the state
hospital's •edical director. and the state hospital's psychiatrists.
Justice Ca•pbell said that the failure of the state psychiatrists
and other county e•ployees to protect the victia fro• a •urderous
attack was not actionable under the Civil Rights claim of Section
1983.

Also, even though the i1111ate was legally in state custody on

furlough, he was in no relationship with the county co••issioners.
The coamissioners were not involved in individual furlough cases.
nor did they know of Prendergast's furlough application.

Judgment

was affirmed for defendants.
The second judicial circuit is coaprised of Connecticut, New
York, and Vermont.

The noteworthy case in this area, and one

si•ilar to that •entioned above is Jane Doe v. United Social and
Mental Health heard in the Connecticut division in 1987.

This case

concerned the ad•inistrator of an estate of a wo•an whom parolee had
•urdered shortly after his parole fro• jail.

The inmate had been

incarcerated for atte•pted bank robbery during which he shot a
female teller.

The administrator brought a civil rights action

against •e•ber of parole board and various parole officers.

In

connection with this release, a wo•an was sexually assaulted by this
sa•e parolee and brought civil rights actions and co••on law
negligence actions against the same and additional defendants.
defendants •oved for sua•ary judg11ent, asserting, a•ong other
argllllents, that the parole officers did not assuae any special

The
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relationship toward either the woaan killed nor the one assaulted by
parolee.

The aotion was granted due to the court's reasoning that

past Connecticut cases did not require the kind of foreseeability
deaonstrated in Tarasoff and Tho•pson.

Looking to Buckley, the

court said that indication of a relationship between the inaate and
the deceased was even weaker here.

There was no demonstration that

the defendants could be charged with awareness of inaate's
dangerousness at the tiae of parole.

Even if such dangerousness

could be assumed, there was no evidence of a special danger for
deceased.

In regard to the woman assaulted, the court failed to

find a special relationship.

The court was careful to point out

that the Connecticut statute governing parole of inmates does not
set out an affir•ative duty for defendants to protect a specific,
defined class of citizens containing either of the plaintiffs.
The third judicial circuit contains Delaware, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania.

Here, there seems to be general consensus that

Tarasoff is good law.

For example, the New Jersey courts not only

adopted, but broadened Tarasoff in Mcintosh v. Milano (1979).

The

facts of Mcintosh were a little different than Tarasoff, pri•arily
because the patient never directly threatened the victim who was
killed by psychiatric patient.

Plaintiffs sustained that the

defendant, having the relevant inforaation at hand, should have
known that his patient posed a threat and should have warned the
victi• or police.

The court held that the defendant psychiatrists

had a duty to protect a potential victi• by whatever steps were
reasonably necessary, and based this duty upon either the

80

relationship giving rise to the obligation of Tarasoff or upon the
broader requirement of a physician to protect the welfare of his
community.
A U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania seeaed to accept the
Tarasoff theory, but could not extend the theory to extend the facts
of the case.

In Leedy v. Hartnett (1981), the court held that the

Veterans Administration owed no duty to two people who were beaten
by an alcoholic veteran recently discharged from a Veterans
Administration hospital.

Although the veteran was staying in the

hoae of the victias, they were not foreseeable victims.

The court

specifically declined to follow Lipari, and granted sua•ary judgment
for the hospital.
During that same year, Hopewell v. Adibempe (1981) was decided
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
This case presents a different problem as the plaintiff here is the
psychiatrist's patient suing a community health center after a
warning was •ade as to her behavior.

The court did recognize

Tarasoff and its accoapanying duty to warn.

Nonetheless, it found

that the duty did not arise from the circuastances at hand and that
the state confidentiality statute was superior to psychiatrist's
defense of an obligation to warn plaintiff's e•ployer.

The court

found the defendant liable but did not foraulate an amount for
damages.
In Miller v. U.S.A. (1983), a suit filed in the District Court
for the Eastern Division of Pennsylvania, the court concluded that
the Pennsylvania Supreae Court would i•pose a duty on a Pennsylvania
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•unicipality to protect a police infor•ant with who• it has
established a special relationship.

Allong the reasons were policy

considerations and reciprocal cooperation between police and
citizens.

The court also considered sections 314 and 315 of the

Restate•ent and the Tarasoff decision.
The fourth judicial circuit contains Maryland, North Carolina.
South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.

Within the fourth

district, Hasanei v. United States (1982) can be cited as further
co••ent on Pennsylvania law.

Here, the Federal District Court of

Maryland, applying Pennsylvania law, failed to find a right or duty
of psychiatrists to predict the actions of a VA outpatient who, by
driving negligently, haraed the plaintiff in a car accident.

The

court co••ented that the ordinary relationship between a
psychiatrist and a voluntary outpatient lacked the capacity of
control needed.

The court did qualify its response, however, by

saying that reasonable actions should be taken where there is a
specific threat to a specific person.
In ter•s of Maryland state law itself, the Maryland Court of
Appeals refused to either accept or reject the Tarasoff decision as
of 1983.

In Shaw v. Glickman (1983), the plaintiff and a separating

couple had all been patients of the same psychiatric teaa.

Dr. Shaw

was injured by the husband when the husband found Dr. Shaw in bed
with the wife.

Dr. Shaw sued the tea• for negligently failing to

warn hi• that one of their patients, the husband, was violent and
unstable and presented a danger to hi•.

The trial court granted

suaaary judgment for the psychiatric tea• on the grounds that Dr.
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Shaw voluntarily placed hi•self within a dangerous plan by beco•ing
the wife's lover.

Although Dr. Shaw appealed, the appeals court

here found that Tarasoff did not apply in this case, because the
husband had not threatened now shown any aniaosity toward the
plaintiff.

Neither did the husband's carrying of a gun iaply danger

to Dr. Shaw.

The court noted that the therapists had a duty founded

in The Hippocratic Oath and in statutory law to preserve
confidentiality.
In Purr v. Spring Grove State Hospital (1983), the Maryland
Appeals Court heard a case about a patient who had a history of
collllitting unnatural sexual acts on boys.

He had undergone a

forensic evaluation and voluntarily co••itted hi•self to the
hospital as part of a plea bargain in a criminal case.

After a

sporadic pattern of leaving and returning to the hospital, he
collllitted brutal acts on an 11-year-old boy and aurdered hia.

In

looking to Thoapson, the court found that the doctors had no duty to
warn because there was no foreseeable victi•.

Swamary judgment was

granted to defendants.
During the following year, 1986, two cases were heard by the
federal courts in this circuit.

In the southern district of West

Virginia, Davis v. Monsanto concerned an employee who brought an
action against the eaployer/defendant by alleging tortious invasion
of privacy and breach of contract, in connection with the eaployer's
disclosures of inforaation that the eaployee gave to the aental
health professional concerning eaployee's potential for
dangerousness.

The court said that there was a difference between
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publication that is required for others' safety and disclosure which
constitutes invasion of privacy.

According to the court, an action

for invasion of privacy de•ands a high level of publicity.

The

court said that it was not a violation of privacy to share a private
fact with another individual or even a s•all group.

Additionally,

the court said that publication of private aatters is entirely
privileged if required by law.

The court then very briefly

summarized the Tarasoff decision.

The court noted that the failure

of one in a special relationship with a aentally disturbed person to
protect others from the danger of that •entally disturbed person
would be subject to damages.

Therefore, the therapist here acted

correctly, and suaaary judgment is granted for defendant.
The second case during that year was Thigpen v. U.S. (1986)
heard in the court of appeals for this circuit.

Thigpen concerned

an action brought under the Tort Claims Act which sought da•ages on
behalf of •inors who were sexually molested by naval hospital
eaployees.

The governaent aoved to dismiss.

Judge Hawkins of the

District Court for the District of South Carolina granted the
governaent's aotion and the ainors appealed.

Judgaent was affiraed.

Circuit Court Judge Murnaghan, who reluctantly concurred in the
decision, stated that a Federal Torts Claia here could not find for
the plaintiffs due to a technical reading of the Act, but eaphasized
that there was, in fact, a special relationship here between the
hospital and the patients/plaintiffs who were injured:

"Hospital

patients stand in particular need of protection froa the institution
responsible for their care.

Weakened by disease or by ... surgery,
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they are peculiarly unable to protect the•selves.

They are ...

psychologically unprepared to •eet a physical attack ... " (p. 402).
During the following year, Currie v. U.S.A. (1987), was heard
in the court of appeals for this circuit.

The case concerned a

wrongful death action that was brought against the U.S. for failure
of psychiatrists at Durhaa, North Carolina VA hospital to
involuntarily co••it a patient who shot the plaintiff's decedent.
Plaintiff is the administratrix of the estate.

The U.S. District

Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted the U.S. a
aotion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.

Although

the plaintiffs tried to analogize the case to Tarasoff, the court
held that there was an iaportant differentiation between the duty to
control and the duty to warn.

The for•er aay infringe upon the

patient's constitutional interests while the latter is but "an
expression of huaanitarianis• and the spirit of the good Sa•aritan"
(p. 213).

This seems to imply that the duty to warn. as held here,

is a voluntary duty based •ore on ethical principles than legal
obligations.

The court also aentions Lipari v. Sears (1980) to say

that a special relationship between psychiatrist and patient !•ports
a duty to that patient, but it is uncertain whether or not a duty
can run to third parties.
The fifth circuit contains Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
Here, •ention should be •ade of Doyle v. United States (1982) which
was decided in a U.S. District Court of California, but which
nonetheless coa•ented on Louisiana law.

The United States District

Court of California !•plied that the Tarasoff reasoning would not be
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accepted in Louisiana.

Without exact reference to Tarasoff, the

court nonetheless said that from a general standpoint. the Louisiana
courts have appeared reluctant to allow liability in cases where
there has been a failure to protect the public fro• a dangerous
individual.
Similarly, in 1987, Willis v. U.S.A. was decided in the Western
District of Louisiana, Alexandria Division.

This was an action

where persons injured in an autoaobile accident, allegedly caused by
a recently discharged Veterans Adainistration hospital patient,
brought suit under the Federal Tort Claias Act.

The district court

looked to Louisiana law to decide that the hospital was not liable
in absence of aedical evidence indicating that the patient was
potentially dangerous at tiae of release and in light of the
reasonable care that had been exercised by the hospital in regard to
release procedures.
In the sixth district, the federal court initially co..ented on
Ohio law in Case v. United States (1981).

The court declared, "The

parties agree that this aatter will be controlled by the law of
Ohio.

Therefore, while instructive, the citations of authority to

Tarasoff and Lipari are not controlling" (p. 318).

In a footnote,

the court further states, "Tarasoff stands alaost alone in its
holding" (p. 318).

This case concerned an executrix who wanted

daaages fro• the United States according to the Federal Tort Claias
Act.

The plaintiff asserted that the govermaent was responsible for

the death of the victia who was aurdered by a psychiatric outpatient
of a Veterans Adainistration hospital.

Because the patient had in
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recent years "i•proved" (not specified in opinion), had been a
working citizen and had been a productive •e•ber of society, he was
dee•ed not to be dangerous to hi•self or others prior to the
occurrence.

Using Ohio law, the court said that the doctors were

not subject to liability if they acted reasonably in releasing the
patient fro• state control.

Additionally, according to the

plaintiff's expert, Dr. Nizny, a co..ent on the patient's condition
•ade to patient's family or friends, without agree•ent as to this,
would be breach of care.

The co•plaint was dis•issed.

In 1983, the Michigan Supre•e Court decided Davis v. Dr. YongOh Lhi•. whereby they adopted the reasoning of Tarasoff and
Tho•pson.

In Davis, the defendant, a state hospital psychiatrist

dis•issed a patient who killed his •other two •onths later.

Relying

on Tarasoff, the appellate court held that the psychiatrist
recognized only a duty to readily-identifiable victi•s and not to
the public at large.
In Chrite v. United States (1983), the federal court of the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division looked to Davis to
•ake the hypothesis that the Michigan Supre•e Court would follow a
Tarasoff and Tho•pson rationale.

The case deter•ined the validity

of a clai• for daaages allegedly caused by the negligence of a VA
hospital in releasing a •ental patient who, six aonths later,
•urdered his aother-in-law.

The court concluded that the Michigan

Supre•e Court would consider holding the defendant responsible for
failure to warn of the released person's dangerousness.
In 1986, the District Court for the Eastern District of
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Michigan, Southern Division decided Soutear v. U.S.A ..

This case

concerned a mental patient's father who brought a wrongful death
action alleging that •edical personnel at the Allen Hospital in the
Shelby Township of Michigan, a VA hospital, were negligent in
releasing a •ental patient and in failing to warn the patient's
parents that the patient posed danger of physical violence to
parents.

The patient subsequently killed his •other.

The court

looked to the case of Davis v. Lhim (1983) to deter•ine that
liability would exist here if a standard of care had been breached.
The VA doctors' belief was that the patient was not dangerous to
anyone, and that this was an opinion for•ulated within the duty of
care.

There was no duty to warn the parents here because there was

a scarcity of evidence to i•ply that the patient would be dangerous.
Moreover, there was enough warning given to the parents, through
notice and explanation of their son's illness, that the patient
could beco•e dangerous.
The seventh circuit contains Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
Although there are no federal cases available for this circuit,
there are two state decisions.

First of all, an Indiana Court of

Appeals in 1981 cited Tarasoff as an acceptable rationale upon which
negligence could be established.

Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981)

concerned a husband who, individually, and as ad•inistrator of
wife's estate, brought an action for the wrongful death of his wife.
The suit included the wife's •urderer, the parents and grandparents
of the •urderer, and the psychiatric facilities which apparently
treated the killer.

Motions to dis•iss the defendants were granted
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to all but the killer.

The husband appealed, and the Court of

Appeals of Indiana ruled in part that the husband's coaplaint
against the psychiatric facilities was valid.

The coaplaint stated

that personnel at centers had charge of the killer and know of his
violent propensities.

The court found that lack of reasonable care

toward the patient led to the resulting incident and that defendants
were liable under Section 319 of the Restateaent (Second) of Torts
describing assuaption of care of another individual.
the court did not define "reasonable care."

Nonetheless,

In footnote 5 of the

opinion, the court cites Tarasoff but still expresses its
uncertainty as to the aeaning of the decision:
We observe, without deciding, that those jurisdictions which
perait an action on this basis are careful to define the
standard of reasonable care as that due fro• si•ilar
professionals in a field where there reaains considerable
uncertainty of diagnosis and tentativeness of professional
judgment (p. 785).
More recently, the March-April, 1988 issue of the Mental and
Physical Disabilities Law Reporter describes a new Indiana law that
took effect Septeaber 1, 1987 which iaaunizes particular health
providers fro• civil liability to third parties.

The new provision

does not hold therapists liable for disclosure of private
inforaation in an effort to coaply with the duty to warn.

That duty

arises if the patient discloses to the practitioner a real threat of
actual violence or bar• against a victi• that could reasonably be
identified or if the patient appears fro• his/her state•ent to pose
i••inent physical threat to others.
his/her duties if he/she

~easonably

The therapist can fulfill
tries to infor• the victta. if

he/she reasonably tries to notify the police in either the patient's
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or victia's area of residence, initiates civil coaaitaent
procedures, or acts to preclude the use of physical violence to
others until law enforcement authorities can be contacted.
Next, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, heard
Novak v. Rathnaa in 1987.

This was on appeal by the plaintiff and

administrator of the estate of a woman killed by a former aental
patient during attempted araed robbery.

The adainistrator had sued

doctors who aore than one year earlier had reco•mended that the
patient be released.

Judge Courson, for the tenth Judicial Circuit

Court, Peoria County, granted the defendants' aotion to dismiss the
coaplaint.

Judge Strouder, for the Appellate Court, ruled that the

doctors' negligence in •aking the reco•aendation despite knowledge
that the patient was dangerous, was not the proxiaate cause of the
injuries that decedent sustained.

Judgment was affir•ed.

Although the crux of this case is the alleged negligent release
of the patient, so•e aention of a duty to warn was included:

"As

has been done in ... cases that have followed ... Tarasotf (although
we believe that Illinois would adopt Tarasoff's affir•ative duty ...
to warn foreseeable third parties) we do not believe ... the duty
... (to) ... extend to victi•s who are not readily identifiable" (p.
775).
The eighth circuit contains Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.

Exaaination of

the eighth circuit reveals that as of 1983, the Iowa and Missouri
courts had refused to decide whether or not the Tarasoff rule would
be adopted.

The relevant cases here are Cole v. Taylor (Iowa,
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1981), Estate of Votteber v. Votteber (Iowa, 1982), and Sherrill v.
Wilson (Missouri, 1983).
In 1985, three cases were heard at the federal level.

At the

district level, Anthony v. U.S.A. (Southern District of Iowa/Central
Division) concerned a voluntarily-adaitted patient, at a Veterans
Adainistration hospital, who later received privileges to leave
hospital grounds.

He subsequently became part of an autoaobile

collision in which the plaintiff sustained serious injuries and the
plaintiff's wife died.
extended.

Plaintiff here asks that Tarasoff be

In response, the court cites Brady v. Hopper (1983),

Leedy v. Hartnett (1981), and Thoapson v. County of Ala•eda (1980),
to deaonstrate that Tarasoff-type liability should not extend to
create a duty to protect unspecified, unidentified persons.
Additionally, Mutual of Oaaha Insurance Co. v. AMerican
National Bank (1985) was filed in the Minnesota Division of the U.S.
District Court.

This was a case resulting fro• insurers' refusal to

pay proceeds upon death of naaed insured who was an apparent
ho•icide victi•.

The insurers sought to obtain hospital and •edical

records of patient who allegedly fraudulently procured the policies.
The court, in deciding this case, said that the rationale behind the
physician-patient privilege was the encourage•ent of the patient to
speak freely with the therapist about personal difficulties.

The

court reviewed the case extensively and found that none of the
exceptions to the privilege apply.

It was said that there •ight be,

in cases where there is an identifiable victi•. a duty to warn but
that was not applicable here.

The court reasoned that even if there
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had been a duty on the part of the psychiatrist to warn the
subsequent victia, this duty would not extend beyond the warning
itself.

The duty would not involve disclosure of records.

The

court coaaented that the privilege and its exceptions were coapeting
areas of interest, to be weighed on an individual, case-by-case
aethod.

Here, the policy seeaed to favor the privilege, especially

since there existed no need for a warning to be given.
At the court of appeals level, Abernathy v. U.S.A. (1985)
concerned the father of a victia beaten to death by an epileptic
individual.

The father charges that the Bureau of Indian Affairs

had control of the individual, but the governaent is held not to be
liable, for fear that the court would be advancing a duty to control
by psychotherapists.

Tarasoff is aentioned in a footnote to show

how Abernathy is different.

For exaaple, the perpetrator in

Abernathy had never aet, nor threatened the victim.
The ninth circuit contains Alaska. Arizona, California, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii.

Other than the

California decisions already discussed for the Ninth Circuit,
aention can also be aade of two other cases.

The earliest is Sakuda

v. Kyodoguai (1983), heard by the U.S. District Court, Hawaiian
division.

This case concerned the parents of a riding crew of a

towed vessel.

They brought a wrongful death action against the

husbandry agent of an oceangoing tug which had towed the vessel, and
alleged that the agent had negligently serviced the two and
negligently failed to warn crew aeabers of potential danger.

The

plaintiff here argues that an exception exists to the rule in eases

92

where the defendant stands in a "special relationship" either to the
person whose conduct needs to be controlled, or to the foreseeable
victi• of that conduct.

Although this case does not involve the

field of psychology, the plaintiffs nonetheless cited Tarasoff and
Lipari for support.

The district court, in saying that these cases

were not applicable, held that the agent stood in no special
relationship to the two so as to give rise to cause of action on
basis of failure to warn of potential danger.

The court concluded

that if it were to hold such a duty in this case, it would happen
that almost any relationship between two persons would give rise to
the duty.
Peterson v. Washington (1983) was a case where the Washington
Court of Appeals chose to follow Lipari.

Here, the plaintiff was

injured when her car was struck by the car of a patient recently
discharged fro• the state hospital.

She charged negligence, saying

that the psychiatrist should have protected her fro• the dangerous
proclivities of the patient.

The court held that the doctor had a

duty to use reasonable precaution in order to protect anyone who
•ight foreseeable be threatened by drug-related •ental proble•s.
The court affir•ed the verdict, finding that the state had a duty to
protect this plaintiff, and that the psychiatrist had acted
negligently in failing to take some action that would have protected
her.
The tenth circuit contains Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico,
Oklaho•a, Utah and Wyo•ing.

Durflinger v. Artiles (1981) was

decided by the federal district court in Kansas.

The court here
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approved of the lower court's e•ploy•ent of Tarasoff as a grounds
for its instructions on the standard of care for psychiatrists who
discharged a •ental hospital patient who, in turn, later killed
plaintiff's wife and sons.

The jury returned a verdict for the

plaintiffs and the defendants appealed.

At the appeal level, in

1984, this court admitted that it had never adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 315 (1965), but discussed the concept of
special relationship in for•er cases.

Previously, then, the court

has held that a special relationship or specific duty has been found
when one creates a foreseeable peril, not readily discoverable, and
fails to warn.

However, the court fails to co•ment further.

Rather, it finds defendants liable on the duty enco•passed in the
general duties of physicians and surgeons.

The court here

recognizes as a valid cause of action the clai• that grew out of a
negligent release of a patient (having violent propensities), from a
state institution, as distinguished from the negligent failure to
warn persons who •ight be injured by the patient as a result of the
release.
In the same year, 1984, Beck v. Kansas University was decided
in the Kansas District Court.

This was an action ste•aing fro• the

shooting of two individuals at the University of Kansas Medical
Center e•ergency room.

The plaintiffs here brought an action

against •e•bers of the Kansas Adult Authority Mental Health Center
for failing to control or protect third parties fro• their patient.
Here, the court was convinced that under Kansas law, a duty existed
on the part of •e•bers of the Adult Authority to protect individuals
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(who could be expected to be found at the University of Kansas
Medical Center) fro• foreseeable har• if they knew or reasonably
should have known of the special danger which the patient posed
toward those individuals.

The court looks back to a recent Kansas

decision and co••ents that although Durflinger was narrowly drawn,
the Kansas Supre•e Court suggested that it would allow liability for
failure to warn.

This court relied on the Kansas Supre•e Court's

approval of Tarasoff and Lipari.
The hall•ark case in this district, however, and the one that
has certainly received the •ost national attention is Brady v.
Hopper (1983), a suit by for•er White House Secretary and other aen
who had been shot by the defendant psychiatrist's patient, John
Hinckley, during an assassination atte•pt on President Reagan.

This

suit was filed in the Federal District Court for Colorado.
The plaintiff's co•plaint pri•arily argues that Hinckley
presented his psychiatrist with symptoms, abnormal behavior, and
historical data that should have persuaded Hopper to •ake a •ore
thorough exa•ination and come to the conclusion that the patient was
dangerous.

The plaintiffs' co•plaint next asserted that the

psychiatrist's treataent aggravated Hinckley's condition, that the
psychiatrist should have sought consultation, and that the
psychiatrist should have warned Hinckley's parents and law
enforce•ent personnel about John Hinckley's dangerousness.
The defense tried a two-pronged approach.

First of all, Dr.

Hopper argued that the relationship between hi•self and Hinckley did
not give rise to a duty.

Dr. Hopper relied upon Hasenei, •entioned
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earlier, in order to substantiate his inability to control the
patient.
Secondly, the defendant used the Thompson decision to say that
there was an absence of a specific threat to a specific person in
this case.

Therefore, Hinckley alerted no one.

Responding to the defense, plaintiffs argued that the
relationship between Hopper and Hinckley could not only be
considered a "special relationship" under the Restate•ent (Second)
of Torts Section 315, but under other relevant sections of the
Restatement as well.

These included Sections 319 ("Duty of Those in

Charge of Person Having Dangerous Propensities") and Section 324A
("Liability to Third Person for Negligent Perfor•ance of
Undertaking").

Additionally, plaintiffs referred to Lipari v. Sears

(1980) to clai• that the doctor had an affirmative duty to take
precautions other than warning for the benefit of others.

The

plaintiffs argued, then. that duties existed not only to foreseeable
victims but to others in general.
The court did not agree.

When ruling on the •otion, it did not

consider whether or not the therapist-patient relationship gave rise
to a broad duty to protect the public, but rather discussed the
extent to which the psychiatrist was obligated to protect particular
plaintiffs fro• this particular har•.

The court said that

foreseeability was of pri•ary i•portance.

Although the court

finally decided that the psychiatrist's treat•ent of Hinckley fell
below the applicable standards of care, the court nevertheless
concluded that the plaintiff's injuries were not foreseeable.
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Consequently, the psychiatrist was not held liable.
Secondly, the court resolved that there was no relationship
between the defendant and the victi•s fro• which a duty •ight
follow.

Judge Moore said that a special relationship does not infer

that there are obligations owed to the general public.

Goodman

co1111ents on the case by saying that Judge Moore see•ed to go even
further than the li•iting holdings in Tho•pson and Megeff.

Lastly,

the court said that there were i•portant reasons to restrain
therapists• responsibilities.

It

re•arked:

"To iapose upon those

in the counseling professions an ill-defined 'duty to control' would
require therapists to be ulti•ately responsible for the actions of
their patients" (p. 1339).

"Hu•an behavior is siaply too

unpredictable, and the field of psychotherapy presently too
inexact ... " (cited in Goodman, 1985, p. 224).

Goodaan reaarks that

Judge Moore was probably influenced by policy considerations, but
wonders what would be the Judge's ruling if it were found that the
defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiffs would be
probable victias.
The eleventh circuit contains Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.
No federal cases are reported at this tiae.

In 1982, the Georgia

Supreae Court applied Tarasoff, together with Mcintosh and Lipari,
to establish a duty to control.

Here, in Bradley Center v. Wessner

(1982), the defendant/appellant hospital failed to exercise
reasonable care, and did not control appellees' father.
Subsequently,

the appellee's •other was killed.

The court said

that in finding the appellant liable it was not creating a tort.
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The court •aintained that it looked to the state's traditional tort
principles of negligence in studying the facts of the case.

The

court also co•mented that the duty to respect a standard of conduct
is recognized as an element of law in other jurisdictions.
More recently, the January-February, 1988 issue of the Mental
and Physical Disabilities Law Reporter cited Swofford v. Cooper
(1987).

Here, a Georgia appeals court upheld medical •alpractice

suits against a psychiatrist whose state hospital patient killed his
father during a two-week ho•e visit.

The patient had been placed in

the hospital due to hoaicidal tendencies.

A pass was approved by

the psychiatrist for the patient after the patient's 11-•onth stay.
The trial court had found for the psychiatrist on the ground that
the patient was contributorily negligent.

The court of appeals

held, however. that the patient could not be held contributorily
negligent because he was psychotic at the ti•e.
was found negligent.

The psychiatrist

Although she argued that the stabbing was

unforeseeable, the court answered that the doctor should have
expected some occurrence of violence that would occur as her result
or omission.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit offers two cases at the federal
level.

Si•pson v. Braider (1985) was heard in the District Court,

D.C. Division.

This was a diversity action brought against a son

and his parents to recover for injuries allegedly sustained when
son, then, a ainor, shot a BB pellet gun fro• an apart•ent window
and struck plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought discovery of parents

concerning psychiatric treat•ent of son and •oved to co•pel answers
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to deposition questions.

The District of Coluabia here studied

legislative history of the physician-patient privilege to show that
the purpose of the provision was to place patients and physicians in
the saae legal relationship as an attorney and his client.

An

exception only occurred in criainal cases where the patient was a
threat to the public.

Thus, there is no exception to the statute

protection in Siapson, regardless of the aention of aental illness.
Also, this privilege extends to parents of a ainor in treataent.
Secondly, the court of appeals in 1986 heard White v. United
States.

Here, the wife of a psychiatric patient brought suit

against the hospital for injuries she suffered when she was attacked
and stabbed by her husband after his escape from the hospital.

The

district court held that the husband's psychotherapist did not have
a duty to warn the wife, and that the hospital was not guilty of
negligence in allowing patient to enter unsupervised hospital
grounds.

The court of appeals, in relying on Rieser v. D.C. (1977),

found that the D.C. court has in the past considered a duty to warn.
The court in White, however, held that the defendant
psychotherapists were not liable because their assessaent of the
patient was reasonable.

The therapists explained that their patient

was able to distinguish fantasizing fro• actual haraing of another.
Furtheraore, the fantasies held by the patient did not represent a
specific threat to the plaintiff.
Thus, Tarasoff has had iaaediate and far-reaching iaplications
for all aental health practitioners.

Although studies aay report

that California therapists seeaed aore affected by Tarasoff, it is
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inevitable that the subsequent Brady v. Hopper 11t1gat1on has
increased awareness of this same duty notion and furthered the
spread of lawsuits alleging the failure to warn.

Interesting to

note ts how some courts have seemed to latch onto certain cases of
the Tarasoff progeny such as the Tho•pson and Lipari cases.

These

cases have gained notoriety in their own right and have also come to
serve, on a less popular level, as a representation of what "duty to
warn" •eans.

Tarasoff, with its roots in fundamental negligence

law, has served to sustain and perpetuate the principles of law
for•ulated by even the authors of the original Restatement of Torts.
What needs to be profiled is whether or not Tarasoff ts, or could
soon beco•e, outdated and burdensome in the present atmosphere of
•odern aental health specialists.

CHAPTER VII
CURRENT LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As these cases illustrate, there are several proble•s in trying
to instrumentalize the Tarasoff reasoning.

Aaong these are the

protection of civil rights. the scope of the confidentiality
promise. the inability to predict dangerousness, the deter•ination
of what is reasonable care, and the legal burden placed on
psychotherapists.
Perhaps it is best to conclude this thesis by showing how well
therapists are working with a duty to warn and how they are
incorporating it into their practice.

In this way, it •ight be

shown where develop•ents are still needed to lessen the interference
with therapy.
From the courts' perspective. the Tarasoff case represents an
array of legal theories.

As can be seen fro• some of the above

stated cases. Constitutional due process is an argument appearing in
recent legal decisions brought against the government.

The

plaintiffs' claims in these cases assert that since the perpetrator
of the violence was a patient of a governaent-run institution. the
plaintiffs who were subsequently hurt were deprived of "life and
liberty" without due process of the law.

In aost of these cases,

however, the courts have held that first of all, the Due Process
clause is not the proaise of life itself.
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Secondly, •any of these
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courts have also found that the governaent in these circu•stances is
protected by iamunity statutes.

Finally, the courts have found that

a duty to control is different than a duty to warn, and that this
duty to warn depends on the state's law.

Often, the states have

looked for a "special relationship" and an "identifiable victi•."
In this way, the courts at least appear to be trying to
•itigate the possibility that all inforaation about parolees and
aental health patients be aade readily available and publicized
without sufficient reason.

Yet, there re•ains real confusion about

the limits of confidentiality and when and to whom it may reaain
absolute.
Many of the above cases focus on privilege and coamunication.
Yet, it is puzzling that if a court ultiaately has a difficult tiae
deciding what is to be admitted into evidence, a therapist aay be
required to somehow aake an individual, often iamediate judgment on
both legal and psychological issues pertaining to his/her client.
The courts are careful to coament that a therapist does not
have a legal duty to control.

Yet, the therapist does have at least

a professional and ethical duty, if not a legal duty as well, to
control the patient's therapy.
whether or not to disclose.

This happens through the decision of

There is a definite line between

controlling and influencing a person's actions.
a fine line.

Nonetheless, it is

Therapy should enable a person to see alternatives and

to recognize the freedom to aake choices.

However. the therapist

would be reaiss if he/she did not atteapt to steer the patient away
fro• poor, debilitative choices.

It is questionable if a patient
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can come to a genuinely free and individual choice tor a positive
alternative when threatened with a psychotherapist's legal duty to
warn.
What Tarasoff appears to hold is that a therapist can be held
accountable for another's actions despite a lack of control over the
person.

What therapists are fearing is not the decision whether or

not to co•mit. (for which they are so•eti•es protected under
statutory i11J11unities). but the actions of the patient outside of
their office.

THus, the judgments for which therapists are •ost

capable and for which they should be held •ost accountable are
exactly those which they can •ake with "discretion."

On the other

hand. they are held accountable for patients' choices that no
education or preparation entirely anticipates.

Perhaps

psychotherapists are believed to be fortified through their study,
wisdo• and fa•iliarity with world of crisis.

Perhaps they are

considered strong enough to endure being the scapegoats in an area
of law not yet fully developed. or yet capable of •eeting its end.
That is to say that while the Tarasotf decision see•s to have been
founded on good intentions. it failed to anticipate the problems of
the holding, especially as to how the duty extends to other kinds of
•ental health practitioners.

Additionally, perhaps psychologists,

because of their training are expected to •aintain heightened
sensitivity to the prediction of violence, a capability not
requested of even police officers who have extensive experience with
cri•inals.
There have been several reco..endations for the confidentiality
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dile••as fro• Tarasoff.

There have also been •any cries for help

a•ong different areas affected by the decisions.

Aaong these pleas

are those of Donald H. Henderson. author of the article "Negligent
Liability and the Foreseeability Factor:

A Central Issue for School

Counselors" appearing in the October 1987 issue of the Journal of
Counseling and Development.

He says that in his state. that are no

guidelines for a counselor to refer to when confronting a troubled
student.

Should he/she refer the student elsewhere and/or notify

the parents?

Also. there seeas to be no adequate suggestions in

much of the case law about the release of confidential inforaation
when the student aay inflict danger on hiaself /herself or others.
Henderson notes. however. that there is sufficient detail relating
to the conditions under which a psychotherapist •ust disclose.
Henderson shows that federal statutory law tries to deal with
this proble• by allowing educational agencies to disclose personally
identifiable information from the educational records of a student
to appropriate parties in connection with an eaergency.

This kind

of legislation upholds the co•mon law doctrine of in loco parentis
and pariens patriae. in which teachers and the state are given the
right to exercise limited authority over pupils and to be
responsible for those who are attending educational institutions.
In the January 18, 1988 edition of Behavior Today, Steven
Engelberg. legal counsel for the Aaerican Association for Marriage
and Faaily Therapy, offers his reco..endations for therapists. who
are being called upon to testify in court.

He advises that a

subpoena for confidential inf or•ation is not a require•ent that the
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infor•ation be divulged.

Rather, it is only a de•and that the one

subpoenaed appear with the requested infor•ation.

Engelberg says

that a therapist should demonstrate reluctance to reveal infor•ation
because it is plainly against the ethical principles of the
profession and that a therapist should not do so unless ordered to
testify by the court.

If the judge so orders. then the therapist

can divulge without fear of violating confidentiality.

Engelberg

says that one may be held in conteapt if he/she refuses to co•ply.
Although confidentiality laws are soaetiaes nebulous, at least
the availability of statutes eases the therapists' predicament.
When faced with the issue precedent to the break of confidentiality.
the determination of dangerousness itself, lawyers and psychologists
alike are at a loss for support.

Where soae courts recognize the

insubstantial amount of evidence on theories of psychological
prediction, the U.S. Supreae Court seems to act capriciously in
relying on psychological data pertaining to the prediction of future
violence.

This is shown in an article by Susan Cunningha• which

appeared in the Septe•ber 1983 issue of the APA Monitor.

In her

article "High court distorts results of research on dangerousness."
Cunningham explains that the U.S. Supreae Court aay have been
incorrect in depending too heavily upon behavioral science research
in two recent cases.

She explains how •ental health practitioners'

abilities can be artificially heightened through •isinterpretation
of inforaation.

She describes two cases.

The first case, Jones v. U.S. (1983), was a narrow, 5-4 ruling
initiated in the District of Coluabia.

Facts of the case concern a
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•an who was caught atte•pting to steal a jacket fro• a depart•ent
store approxi•ately eight years previous to the publication.

At his

trial. he was successful with an insanity defense and was sent to a
federal •ental hospital for eight years.

Now. Jones is trying to

gain freedom.
The case is fraught with a Constitutional ·due process problems.
burden of proof shifting and confrontation with at least two •ental
health experts who at least imply that the Court is incorrect in
their view on •ental health work.
The crux of the discussion is that the Court's decision in this
case allows a patient to stay indefinitely at a federal •ental
hospital for reasons of insanity, even though that patient may not
be dangerous to society.

Although civil co•mit•ent hearings in the

district require the governaent to give a preponderance of evidence
that the defendant is dangerous, the burden to prove that defendant
is not dangerous shifts to defendant in cri•inal cases.

That is to

say that a cri•inal defendant with an insanity defense is
auto•atically presumed to be dangerous, and subject to commit•ent.
unless he can prove otherwise.

Jones apparently had been given the

opportunity to prove hi•self. but these details were not described
in the article.
Allong the opponents of the Court's decision was a District of
Coluabia public defender who argued that the Constitutional
provisions of due process require the government to let go of Jones
or to turn to civil co••it•ent proceedings after one year.

Another

opponent is psychologist John Monahan of the University of Virginia
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who argues that it is virtually iapossible to predict future
dangerousness even in those situations where an individual has
coaaitted a violent act in the past.

Also, the prediction is weaker

still when, as in the Jones case, there has been no previous violent
episode.
The person who really seems to have taken a hold on this view
was Justice Brennan who wrote the dissent for Jones.

He quoted

Monahan frequently and argued directly against the aajority's
contention by saying "even if an insanity acquitee re•ains •entally
ill. so long as he has not repeated the saae act since his offense,
the passage of tiae diainishes the likelihood that he will repeat
it" (p. 3).

However, the •ajority of the Court sustained its

holding that a cri•inal action dictates dangerousness, and the
ruling stands.

Monahan proposes that this aore liberal finding on

the criteria for dangerousness could influence lower courts and
create obstacles to release for those who are civilly coaaitted.
An interesting twist is that the court in Jones see•ed to be
indifferent to aental researchers but supported •ental health
experts in a second case, Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) decided at
approxiaately the saae time.
Estelle is a Texas case concerning a aurderer who challenged
the coapetencies of the two psychiatrists who deterained that he
would be dangerous.

Not only did the high court state that

psychiatrists as a class were capable of judging potential violence,
but also held that the doctors could even aake a judgaent on
hypothetical profiles of the defendant, while absent actual
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examination of the defendant himself.

What is interesting to note

is that the Estelle case is at least the second time in judicial
authority that Texas has been allowed to acknowledge low reliability
and prejudicial impact of expert testiaony as to future
dangerousness. while proceeding with the evidence.

In both cases,

the APA filed an amicus curiae brief for the defendant and lost.
The Court's majority, according to this article, seems to be
saying that compromising, even in death penalty situations, is
acceptable.

Justice White, of the aajority, wrote:

"Neither

petitioner nor the Association suggest that psychiatrists are always
wrong with respect to future dangerousness" (cited in APA Monitor,
1983, p. 3).

Leonard Rubenstein, of the Mental Health Law Project,

found this reasoning in opposition to the rules of evidence.

He

implied that it would be admitting false testiaony to include the
testi•ony of an.expert witness whose statements are "predicated on
the belief that he is likely to be more wrong than right" (cited in
APA Monitor, 1983, p. 3).
Siailar to Jones, Estelle presents problems of due process.
John Duncan, of the Texas American Civil Liberties Union, says that
untruths were absolute denials of constitutional guarantees.
Consequently. the Texas chapter of the ACLU also filed an aaicus
curiae for the defendant.
Of the court. Justice Blackmun seeaed to be the aost outspoken
for the dissent.

He made a differentiation that, in his eyes, would

allow expert witness testi•ony:

"One may accept this in a routine

lawsuit for money damages, but when a person's life is at stake--no
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aatter how heinous his offense--a requirement of greater reliability
should prevail" (cited in APA Monitor, 1983, p. 3).

Secondly, he

pointed out that the witness testimony used here did not even
qualify as expert testimony.

He said that one of the criteria, that

the state of scientific knowledge in the area be established and
accepted by the scientific coaaunity, was absent.
was very disturbed by the 11ajority's opinion.

Judge Blackaun

"Ulti11ately," he

said. "when the Court knows full well that psychiatrists'
predictions of dangerousness are specious, there can be no excuse
for iaposing on the defendant, on pain of his life. the heavy burden
of convincing laymen of the fraud" (cited in APA Monitor, 1983, p.
3).

Another daaaging effect pointed out is that even the 11ajority
•embers in this case were aware that the two psychiatrists who
testified against the defendant sy11bolized a minority within the
profession.

One was named "Dr. Death" or the "Killer Shrink" by

Texas defense attorneys.

He represented that he was "100 percent

and absolute" that defendant would become violent again.
Although Blackmon pointed out the lack of expertise on the part
of these doctors. the Court countered by saying that crossexaaination and defense expert witnesses could be provided for a
counterbalance.

Blackmon responded by saying that the jury doesn't

always properly decide the merits of an expert witness.

He recalled

studies that show the tendency of jurors and judges to accept
scientific testimony without proper exaJ1ination.

Nonetheless.

Justice White of the 11ajority said that "There is no doubt that the
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psychiatric testi•ony increased the likelihood that the petitioner
would be sentenced to death . . . . But this fact does not •ake that
evidence inad•issible," (cited in APA Monitor, 1983, p. 3).
The Barefoot opinion, according to this article. •eans that
states can decide individually the •eans of regulating expert
testi•ony in capital cases if they decide to regulate.

Even •ore

devastating is the Supre•e Court's reasoning that juveniles •ay be
held in custody before a "trial" on the allegations against them.
Recently, (Nove•ber 1984), the APA Monitor presented Susan
Cunningham's article entitled "Preventive detention law seen as
setback for youth and blow to science."

Here, it was shown that the

recent Supre•e Court's ruling allows states to detain juvenile
suspects before trial and is indifferent to recent research on
predicting violent behavior.

According to juvenile justice

advocates, says Cunningha•, it also serves to inhibit attempts to
81leliorate jail conditions for juveniles.

In light of the loco

pariens theory •entioned before, the Schall v. Martin (1984) case
allowing preventive detention was viewed not to be punishment and
not denial of due process because juveniles are always in some kind
of custody.
Mental health practitioners arguing from a legal standpoint may
assert that the average citizen who •akes a threat is not subject to
others' scrutiny while others who are •aking a responsible choice by
seeking therapy i•plicate the•selves by being honest with their
therapist.

So•e •ental health practitioners •ay see this

possibility a deterrent to those needing therapy.

On the other-
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hand, others •ay state that patients' reporting feelings of violence
after a therapist's warning are people truly wanting help and
protection for the•selves and others.

If clients, aware of their

choice to drop counseling at any point, proceed with therapy after
having been given a warning about a possible break in
confidentiality, they are •aking the future decision to be subject
to interrogation about violence.

In fact, so•e •ay even be

encouraged to continue therapy by using the warning about potential
violence as a catalyst for discussion of that very problem.
Maybe •ental health practitioners are being forced into
thinking that they are controllers and predictors.

If legal

require•ents expand even further, the patient •ay in turn fall into
a false belief syste• about hi•self /herself and begin to believe
that he or she is really dangerous.

Consequently, the helping

professions might facilitate the belief that •ental health patients
are dangerous and uncontrollable.

This •ay also di•inish patients'

taking responsibility for their actions.
These predictions should not •aterialize if, as the courts
assert, reasonable care is followed.

Tarasoff, as explained in

Doyle v. U.S.A., held that psychotherapists are entitled, within
bounds of professional co•petence, to broad discretion as well as to
the •anner in which they conduct exams.

Each practitioner's

sequence of activities is usually respected and not questioned as
long as he/she includes those essential to therapy.
The courts see• to be saying two things at once.

It appears

that although counsel support rehabilitation of cri•inals, they
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would like to base that rehabilitation on a regimen, a structure, a
litany of requireaents that can be found within the Restateaent.

As

was seen. however, the Restateaent contains contradictory
provisions. aany exceptions and n1111erous overlaps.

Some states have

still not adopted fully the Restateaent reasoning in their Tarasoff
cases.
Reasonable care is not an easy definition.

Yet, in light of

the fact that violence is hard to predict, reasonable care re•ains a
key coaponent to finding liability.

Behavior Today (Dece•ber 28th-

January 4th, 1988) aade •ention of a paper presented at a APA
conference by David L. Shapiro who stated that "Review of

recent

court decisions highlight the fact that ... legal liability of the
•ental health professional rarely ... is due to ... failure to
predict dangerousness, but rather (to) the failure to do an
assessaent on which a decision ... •ay be based" (p. 6).

Although

only this stateaent is included in order to represent Shapiro's
paper, it appears safe to assume that Shapiro believes in using a
diagnostic procedure, rather than the course of therapy, in order to
handle the duty problem.

In short. he seems to hold that •ore

sophisticated intake procedures, capable of readily identifying
dangerous propensity, •ay alleviate practitioners' anxieties.
Paul S. Appelba1111, M.D .• contributed to Beck's edited book
through "I•plications of Tarasoff for Clinical Practice" (p. 93) and
"Rethinking the Duty to Protect" (p. 109).

Each enco•passes the

factors already aentioned, while aaking a co..ent on reasonable
care.

In the latter chapter, the describes the proble•atic effects
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of Tarasoff at four stages:

(a) prior to the initiation of therapy,

(b) during the usual course of therapy, (c) when the therapist
suspects the patient •ay intend to co••it a violent act, and (d)
when a suit is brought alleging that the duty to protect has been
breached.
In the first category, Appelbau• suggests that decisions on the
duty to protect will deter patients from seeking needed psychiatric
care.

Although studies are sparse, Appelbaum argues that recent

studies have shown that patients place a high value on the
protection of their revelations.

AppelbaUll anticipates that not

only will potentially-violent patients be deterred fro• getting
treat•ent, but that •ental health practitioners will also begin to
cease treating potentially violent patients.
In the second category, AppelbaUll fears that therapists •ay
begin putting inappropriate e•phasis on exploring patients' violent
fantasies, thereby ignoring other valid areas of concern.
refers to a study illustrating this pheno•enon.

Appelbaum

He further co••ents

that this sa11e study indicated so•e therapists' refusal to confront
violent propensities for fear that they, as therapists, would be
required to take action.

Appelbaum is concerned that the Tarasoff

proble• •ight be an unnecessary distraction to therapists who become
preoccupied with potential liability and fail to deal
therapeutically with clients.
In the third category, Appelbaum is concerned that Tarasoff
effects tend to influence overprediction.

When joined with the

therapist's uncertainty, "unnecessarily intrusive but potentially
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•ore secure alternatives (such as involuntary co••itaent) will
frequently be chosen" (p. 115).

Finally, Appelbaum concludes that

there aay not be any aeasure•ent at all as to predicting
dangerousness.

"Nor are the courts in a position to impose a

standard of care, as they have in other areas of aedical practice,
such as informed consent. because they are equally at a loss to
suggest how prediction •ight be accoaplished" (p. 116).

Appelbaum

points out that the court's failure to identify "reasonable steps"
to protect a third party creates aore obstacles to therapist's
practice.

The crux of the problem in this area is that Tarasoff and

other decisions state that a lay standard of reasonableness. rather
than a professional standard of behavior should apply.

He points

out that the jury aay construct too coaprehensive a picture, and
that a subsequent occurrence of violence would •ean that "all
reasonably necessary steps were not taken" (p. 116).

Appelbaum

explains that there is always another step that can be taken in any
situation.

The absence of a professional standard increases

therapists' frustration in independently deciding whether they have
done enough.

If a professional standard were available for

therapists, practitioners would have a defense in having satisfied
the recommendations.
In light of all the criticism that AppelbaUll has for the
Tarasoff requireaents, he decides to construct his own overview of a
proposal.

In the preface to his proposal, he states that first and

foreaost, therapists have a aoral duty to protect third parties.
is a aoral duty which encoapasses and surpasses the le2al duty.·

It
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Appelbau•'s definition of a •oral duty 1s a belief "that hu•an
beings in an organized society face a •oral i•perative to co•e to
the assistance of their fellow hu•an beings whose safety is
endangered" (p. 117).

Appelbaum co••ents, though, that "there is

often no way to keep the •oral obligations of a psychotherapist from
being translated into legal standards" (p. 118).
The duty that Appelbau• perceives is fourfold.

The first part

of this duty should be to collect infor•ation relevant to an
evaluation of the patient's potential dangerousness as found under
accepted professional standards.

He suggests that these standards

entail deter•ining whether or not the patients have engaged in
violence or •ade threats of violence in the past.

Appelbaum points

out the unfortunate side of court deliberations when the judges and
juries tend to scrutinize records of treatment after a violent act
has occurred.

Appelbau• thinks that it is unfortunate that

indications of dangerousness can usually be found in these
circu•stances, but are not readily revealable when the therapist is
conducting the interview.

A history of past violence, then, see•s a

good criterion and an easy de•arcation line.
At the time that a violent act beco•es i•minent. Appelbaum
suggests that the therapist should be required to obtain appropriate
information of the professional standard for dangerousness.

Despite

the lack of solid data regarding predictions of dangerousness,
Appelbaum offers a co•promise through saying that "consensus can be
achieved as to which infor•ation allows the best possible
predictions of dangerousness to be •ade, even as we acknowledge that
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those predictions are often highly inaccurate" (p. 122).

He see•s

to be saying that •ost professionals will agree that particular
characteristics lead to dangerousness •ore often than not.
Appelbawa disagrees with Justice Mosk's reco..endation that
therapists are only held accountable for failure to warn when they
first have come to a conclusion that their patient is dangerous,
and, secondly, when they then fail to take steps necessary to
prevent the danger.

He suggests that the view is too vague and •ay

even encourage therapists not to coae to a conclusion about their
patients' dangerousness.

Instead of the Mosk rule. then, Appelbaum

suggests a standard where professional guidelines need not be
determined.

Rather, re•edies could be obtained where there was

"outrageous neglect of professional and co••on sense" (p. 124).

In

this way, only clinicians acting in reckless disregard of the
evidence would be held negligent.

The art of "defensive psychiatry"

(p. 124) would be lessened.
Once a therapist deter•ines that a patient •ay be violent
toward others, the duty to protect requires the clinician to take
reasonable steps to safeguard potential victi•s.

The court of

action, according to AppelbaU.11 should rest on a "reasonable care"
•ode!.

"As long as therapists are held to a genuine professional

standard of care-in contrast to Tarasoff's lay standard- ... they
should be able to select any reasonable option or coabination of
options with the assurance that liability will not ensue" (pp. 12526).

Appelbaua adds that •any ele•ents constitute reasonable

behavior.

These include availability of resources, support staff,
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ti•e. and •oney.

With consideration of these factors. reasonable

care •ight be concluded from the •aximum use of the•.

Thus.

Appelbaum concludes that therapists' actions would be judged by a
professional standard of care except in those areas of prediction
for dangerousness where no •eaningful professional standards have
yet developed.
In his other chapter, "Implications of Tarasoff for Clinical
Practice," Appelbaum states •any of the sa•e propositions as above
but places special emphasis on assessment procedures, along with
selection of a course of action and implementation.

Focus will be

on the first only because Appelbaum states that the •ost crucial
weakness a•ong therapists is inadequate assess•ent.

He asserts that

the best protection for therapists •ight not be an attempt to
predict liability, but a concerted effort to obtain sufficient
information for reasonable clinical care.
co•ponents to a substantial intake.

He offers three

The first includes a history

and biographical sketch of the person.

Factors to be included are

age, sex, race, socioecono•ic status, history of substance abuse,
intelligence, education and residential/employment stability.

A

second co•ponent is assessing the psychological functioning of the
patient as it is linked to the ability to control violent impulses
(e.g. co••and hallucinations).

The third co•ponent includes

studying the environmental circu•stances that are prone to provoke
or inhibit the expression of violent impulses.
Appelbaum admits that research about prediction of violence is
aabiguous.

He co••ents that not only is there an absence of such
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studies, but that ethical and legal considerations prevent even the
aost feasible designs to be tested.

Appelbaum coaaents, however,

that Monahan's work in the field has shown that aany aental health
practitioners feel capable of predicting violence that occurs within
hours or days of the session as opposed to that occurring within
weeks or •onths.

Appelbaum co•aents that this differentiation

exists because i••inent violence can be ascertained through present
mental states and current environmental decisions.

Perhaps this

kind of demarcation could serve as a component in a standard for
reasonable care.

Still, Appelbaum says that even these short-term

predictions have no genuine accuracy at this ti•e.
In the chapter, "Overview and Conclusions," Beck aakes his own
suggestions to therapists in the wake of the Tarasoff controversy.
He says that initially, the psychiatrist should have a thorough
discussion with the patient about the patient's intentions, •ake a
thorough assessment of the patient's aental status and then consult
with a colleague.

Beck suggests that in so•e cases it •ay even be

possible to bring in the proposed colleague for a three-party
conference.

If not, Beck suggests calling the victi• on the phone

while the patient is present.

If such •ethods do not work, then the

therapist should at least let the patient know what plans he or she
will •ake to contact the victim.

In all cases, according to Beck,

the therapist should write a note listing his or her assess•ent,
conclusions and plans for action.
Like Appelbaum, Beck agrees that the actions of a therapist
according to Tarasoff should be judged according to a professional
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standard of negligence and not an ordinary standard.

Beck thinks

that this is appropriate because the Tarasoff duty itself rests on
the existence of a special relationship.

Si•ilarly, a professional

standard should also be used in deteraining whether or not adequate
steps have been taken to assure that the course of action has been
carried out.
In the August 26th. 1985 newsletter of Behavior Today, an
article entitled "Professional Differences in Assessing
Dangerousness" described a study done by Bruce A. Eather. Ph.D.

The

study consisted of reports from 80 doctorally-prepared psychologists
froa special divisions of the APA and 80 board-certified
psychiatrists, all licensed to practice in the state of California.
This was a survey in which each of the subjects received one of two
specifically-designed fictitious case reports describing an
individual who demonstrated at least soae degree of disturbance and
potential dangerousness.

Respondents were asked to decide:

(a)

whether or not the individual needed involuntary civil coaaitment
for legal reasons of being mentally ill and/or dangerous to others;
(b) the level of dangerousness, and (c) the factor(a) that •ost
influenced their decision.

Additionally, a six-itea questionnaire

was included for the purposes of surveying psychologists and
psychiatrists about their attitudes toward areas related to
voluntary/involuntary coaait•ent.

Clinicians were also requested to

reveal their professional interests, their years licensed and the
extent of their for•er professional involve•ent in civil co..it•ent
proceedings.
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Eather's study revealed an i•portant nu•ber of differences
between psychologists and psychiatrists.

For exaaple, psychiatrists

were often more likely than psychologists to involuntarily co•mit
the presented individual.

Bather suggests that this aight be an

effect of psychiatrists' reliance on a aedical •odel which views
civil coaait•ent as a valid aove by the state to help the aentally
ill.

Secondly, psychiatrists aay have •ore experience with

coamitaent proceedings.

Psychiatrists also assessed the individuals

in the sketches as being •ore dangerous than the psychologists did.
There were also iaportant differences between psychologists and
psychiatrists in regard to their thoughts about evidentiary
standards of proof that should apply during co.. itaent hearings.
Most of the psychologists favored using "clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence" (p. 3), while psychiatrists usually supported
the judicial syste•s' aost liberal standard, "preponderance of
evidence" (p. 3).

This latter view seeas to support the fact that

therapists also are •ore willing to co•mit patients and were found.
through the study, to see the sample clients as aore dangerous.
Additional questionnaire infor•ation revealed that neither
psychiatrists nor psychologists believed that they were "qualified"
at predicting dangerousness.

Each group recognized the other as

qualified to •ake judgments in regard to so•e deterainations of
dangerousness.

Both refuted the idea of granting lawyers expert

witness status on such aatters.
To cite so•e encourage•ent for therapists at this point. the
Noveaber 12, 1987 issue of Guidepost (of the Allerican Associati,on
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for Counseling and Developaent) contained an article pertaining to
liability.

Staff writer Naoai Thiers focused on recent iaplications

of Tarasoff.

She assured the reader that the psychologists who have

studied the problem have found that suits against aental health
practitioners are still uncoa•on, especially aaong those who are
ethical.

Two authorities upon whoa she relies for her article are

Paul Snider, an Allerican Mental Health Counselor Association •eaber
and Burt Bertram. chair of the AACD Insurance Trust.

Snider argues

that the aental health counselor and probably his/her supervisor are
those aost susceptible to liability.

Bertram advises that it is not

easy to get data on the number of suits pursued against counselors
because information is not categorized and is often even
confidential.

Bertraa was able to say that AACD's insurer is

receiving at least 6,000 aore applications for coverage, but an
increase is not necessarily linked to litigation, especially
litigation tied to Tarasoff.

In fact, Cunningham says that

counselors are sued aostly for alleged sexual aisconduct.
Snider recognizes an increasing willingness on the part of
today's consu•ers to take their therapists to court.

Nonetheless,

he cautions against therapists being preoccupied with the
possibility of litigation to the extent that fear interferes with
their counseling.
Both Snider and Bertram try to see soae good eaanating froa the
Tarasoff influence.

For exaaple, Bertrl!lll said "If there's a silver

lining it's that we as a profession are going to begin practicing
with the full recognition that if we overstep our expertise, if we
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proaise what we can't deliver, we •ay be held accountable" (p. 116).
Snider agreed by adding therapists are becoaing aore attentive to
what transpires in therapy sessions.
increasingly i•portant.

Goal-setting has beco•e

He recouends "three Rs" to prevent

litigation rapport with clients, reasonable behavior, and extensive
record-keeping.

Snider continues by stating that having an "open"

and "honest" relationship with clients is the best safeguard for
litigation.

Rapport, as •entioned in Chapter II of this thesis,

allows the counselor and patient to be candid with each other and to
discuss the possibility of consequences.

The therapist who has a

good therapeutic relationship with his/her client is better able to
evoke the client's true intentions.

Reasonable behavior precludes

potential injury while not alar•ing the client.

As long as the

behavior can be anticipated by the client (as through an earlier
explanation of warning) and is based on a relationship with the
client and not on the therapist•s eagerness to avoid liability,
intervention should not beco•e a problem.

Finally, record-keeping

provides the therapist with concrete evidence of having •et legal
obligations if he/she faces a lawsuit.
Appelbaum and Beck seea to concur with what Snider says,
although each of the foraer has different kinds of suggestions.
Appelbaua asserts that the initial stage of gathering infor•ation
(Snider's record-keeping) is the •ost essential part of protection
fro• liability.

At this ti•e. the therapist should pay special

attention to the client's past and his/her propensity toward
violence.

Beck, on the other band, places e•phasis on the
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relationship with the client (Snider's rapport).

He argues that

Tarasoff-type duties aay be fulfilling by fashioning a clinical
warning against violence, one which appears to be for the client 1 s
own welfare.

He explains that this approach not only precludes

threatening the client with the law, but actually serves to
strengthen the therapeutic relationship, as the therapist appears
truly concerned about his/her client.

Both Appelbau• and Beck agree

that a aixture of ordinary precautions will adequate protect the
practitioner fro• liability.

Appelbaum says" ... clinicians have

learned to live with Tarasoff, recognizing that good coa•on sense,
sound clinical practice, careful documentation, and a genuine
concern for their patients, are alaost always sufficient to fulfill
their legal obligations" (p. 106).

Similarly, Beck coaaents that

"there is reason to believe that we can identify aost potentially
violent patients.

If we rely on our clinical judgment and use good

sense, we will serve our patients and society well, and protect
ourselves in the bargain" (p. 138).
In returning to the beginning of this thesis and Lord Esher's
"larger proposition" theory, what therapists and lawyers alike •ay
be trying to do is to show that a relationship iaports duty and
responsibilities.

Unfortunately, the ships used in Esher's

negligence exaaple are easier to steer and guide than people, and
aany professionals hold contrary viewpoints as to the extent of
carrying out this duty and the nuaber of people to whom it should
apply.
Counsel aay cling to the layaan's standard of "reasonable
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care."

At present, that see•s to be the overwhel•ing consensus, but

this writer fears that even this standard will be subject to further
subdivision and categorization in the ti•e to co•e.

In addition to

the expert witnesses already being used, reasonable care •ight be
further defined by the elitis• of the profession.

Those

professionals with the least education and experience in the •ental
health field would becoae •ost vulnerable to liability.
Additionally, courts •ay look to whether or not the profession is
regulated.

Those particular professions not enjoying licensure.

certification nor registration aay be aore vulnerable to liability
suits for negligence because they have no professional standards on
which to rely.
The ultimate separation of classes can also be understood from
a practical view.

For exaaple, a therapist without a •edical or

advanced graduate degree aay be seen by juries or finders of fact as
less capable or knowledgeable.

This hypothesis aay be draaatized

when expert witnesses with consuamate degrees are called in to
testify against the therapist.

It is conceivable that the experts

would set out additional, reasonable steps that the therapists did
not consider.

If these ra.11ifications becaae prevalent today,

patients aay begin to avoid therapists altogether.

Similarly,

therapists would begin to surrender their own clients.

As

therapists and counselors often rely on authorities such as
psychologists and psychiatrists for consulting purposes, it is not
difficult to see therapists' increased reliance on these
professionals, especially in duty-to-warn situations.

The
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independence of the aore conteaporary therapies aay falter and
clients who are seen as potentially dangerous may be given referrals
by their own therapists to doctors and psychologists owning aore
credentials.

Eather's study already showed clear differences

between aedical mental health therapists and psychologists.
Additionally, a recent article in the March-April, 1988 issue of
Social Work aagazine responded that social workers as a group are
•ore likely than either psychologists or psychiatrists to breach
confidentiality in certain situations.
was si•ilar to Eather's work.

The study that was conducted

It included a survey based on 10

vignettes which concerned the breaking of confidentiality.

Results

showed that social workers are aore likely than psychiatrists or
psychologists to adait that they will disclose confidential
inforaation when asked about the specified clinical situations.

No

aention was •ade in the article as to the nature of these vignettes.
There were no i•portant relationships between the responses and
gender or exposure to clients.

Older social workers, however, are

more likely to keep confidence.

The authors conclude that these

results aay reflect the nature of social workers' professions.
Social workers' roles are aore nebulous and their experience with
cases concerning potential hara is aore liaited than that of
psychiatrists and psychologists:

"Presented with socially

threatening behavior, social workers' position is relatively aore
vulnerable and probably more aabiguous than that of colleagues in
psychiatry or psychology to whoa they aust report" (p. 158).
If one of the purposes of the behavioral science professions is

125

to create helping relationships, there should be so•e forethought by
the courts to protect these therapies.

Other than financial

differences, so•e clients inevitably prefer talking with a "social
worker," instead of a "psychiatrist" because the latter is still
someti•es a sy•bol of sickness and serious •aladjust•ent.
Similarly, so•e people will only talk to priests or religious
advisers in the hope of avoiding •ental health therapists
altogether.

If the ability to find liability for negligence among

these professions continues, both client and counselor will shy away
from forming helping relationships.

The counselor will fear

ulti•ate lawsuits with each personal encounter.
fear disclosure of problems that need discussing.

The clients will
In short, those

in need of help would not get it, and the actual violence that is
feared would not be curtailed.

In addition, the now-burgeoning

field of new therapies •ight begin to deflate as practitioners began
to balance the constant threat of liability against only the
potential of a rewarding and fulfilling career.
In Durflinger, it was assured that negligence •ay not
ordinarily be found short of serious error or •istake.

It is

difficult to ascertain during therapy precisely what makes a serious
error or •istake.

Unfortunately, according to Beck, courts often

see a "serious" error with perfect, retrospective vision at
subsequent court hearings.

In Lord Esher's ti•e, serious error •ay

have been the collision of two boats whose captains anticipated the
crash.

But the collision a11ong people and the bar• done by

individuals to one another is currently i ..easurable and
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unpredictable.

Perhaps a step toward preventing what is only

thought to be a dangerous situation •ay •erely delay, not te•per a
furor.

As seen in the Tarasoff case, Poddar left therapy shortly

after being stopped and questioned by police.

Feelings powerfully

tinged with anger and violence that are addressed, but left
unexplained, are less apt to lose their forcefulness.

An e•phasis

on legal punish•ent and punitive reaction only heightens the
confusion among mental health patients.

Such an at•osphere can lead

to greater psychological sickness and an even larger propensity
toward uncivilized and destructive behavior.
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permission for use of one of the tables in State Credentialing of
the Behavioral Science Professions: Counselors, Psychologists and
Social Workers. As a graduate student at the Loyola University of
Chicago, I am writing a thesis for the coapletion of a Master's
degree in Counseling Psychology. Much of your report was extremely
helpful.
In intend to use Table II-1 which appears on page 11 of your
report. It will appear in •Y paper in exactly the saae for•at,
aside from a different type. It is entitled "State Regulation of
the Behavioral Sciences Professions." The report appears in •Y
reference list and is named in the text as well. Nonetheless. I
really need your consent to reproduce the table. Your office
instructed ae to write this letter.
For your interest, •Y thesis concerns •ental health
practitioners' legal duty to warn third parties of potentially
violent patients. As I include all therapists within this topic, I
address the differences among counselors. One of the •ost i•portant
dissi•ilarities is the presence or absence of licensure.
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Suaaary of People v. Poddar
The cri•inal case of People v. Poddar (1969) contained facts
very siailar to those specified in the civil case of Tarasoff.
Initially, Poddar was convicted by the Superior Court of Alaaeda
County.

The defense appealed on the goals of iaproper jury

instructions.

The case on appeal can be divided into two aajor

parts, each having several coaponents.

The first part concerns

argU11ents for and against the inclusion of testiaony and evidence on
behalf of Poddar.
Appellant asserts that the court should have instructed the
jury on unconsciousness for a coaplete defense.

According to

precedent in California, the court is obliged to instruct the jury
on law principles which have a close connection with the facts of
the case.

What is needed is substantial evidence to apprise the

trial judge of plausible issues.
The defense counsel asserts two eleaents relating to
unconsciousness.

One is the testiaony of a neurologist who exaained

Poddar's electroencephalograa and found a teaporal lobe lesion. a
defect which aay relate to uncontrollable seizures of which the
defendant is not aware.

The appeals court disaissed the aremaent,

re•inding the defense counsel that the infor•ation had initially
been used to explain proble•s in controlling aggressiveness, and had
not been used to reflect unconsciousness.
A stronger criterion is the testi•ony of one of the
psychiatrists, Dr. Grossi, who testified that the defendant's
psychotic state did not allow the defendant to understand the
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killing.

When asked about the issue of consciousness. Dr. Grossi

explained that he had not used that specific ter•.
Finally, the court of appeals found that a defense of
unconsciousness should not have been included in the jury
instructions because trial counsel itself requested fro• the jury a
verdict of •anslaughter in the opening argu•ent.
a co•plete, and not a partial defense.

Unconsciousness is

It could not be used

independently in a •anslaughter verdict.
The second co•ponent under Part 1 concerns the exclusion of the
testiaony of the anthropologist.

As •entioned in the text of this

thesis, defense counsel offered to show that an expert witness
holding a degree in social sciences, and having the experience of
living in India for several years, could de•onstrate that Poddar's
status as an "untouchable" directly led to his diminished capacity.
The court refused the witness an opportunity to draw the analogy,
suggesting that the witness only be allowed to answer hypothetical
questions about Poddar's cultural adaptation.

The court reasoned

that diminished capacity is a •ental illness and could only be
thoroughly diagnosed by those in the respective field.

The court

further explained that allowing such testi•ony would open a
floodgate of testi•onies which would only confuse the jury.

The

court also co..ented that stress regarding cultural differences had
already been accounted for by Poddar'a psychiatrists.
The last two ele•ents of Part 1 include arguments against
exclusion of testi•ony about Poddar's behavior after the killing,
and inclusion of testi•ony by a court appointed psychiatrist.
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Regarding the for•er, the court had not allowed the testi•ony of a
lay witness na•ed Mr. Martinez who supposedly would offer evidence
that he had seen defendant talking to hi•self approxi•ately four
•onths after the killing.

The court of appeals aff ir•ed the

exclusion, saying that it had been too re•ote in ti•e and that the
testi•ony of the defendant's state of •ind had already been
extensive.
The defendant clai•s that the latter proble•, the testi•ony of
a Dr. Peschau, should not have been allowed because the record does
not specify that Poddar had been allowed to re•ain silent or had had
a right to counsel before the interview co••enced.

The court of

appeals said that no prior objection to this testi•ony had been •ade
and that the issue could not be raised for the first ti•e on appeal.
Further•ore, Dr. Peschau's testi•ony did not contain any
incri•inating state•ents •ade by the defendant.
Part 2 of the case at the court of appeals concerns the
instructions to the jury on different charges, a•ong these first
degree aurder.

Defense counsel asserts that although the verdict

was of second degree •urder, it was error that the court instructed
the jury on first degree •order because the very instruction •ade it
less likely that the jury would find the lesser degree of
•anslaughter.

The court of appeals does not hold that there was

such a likelihood in this case.
pre•editation in this case.

The court cites nine indications of

Defense counsel suggests that the

pre•editation is inextricably linked with the inability of the
defendant to conduct calculated decisions and cannot be regarded as

138
genuine planning of a cri•e.

In furtherance of their stand, the

court relies on the record to show that the jury took extensive ti•e
in reaching its decision, specifically in considering second degree
•urder and •anslaughter.

First degree •urder did not see• to be at

issue and so it does not appear that the decision was reached by
co•pro•ise.
The next co•ponent of Part 2 was applicant's contesting the use
of instruction on involuntary •anslaughter which arises fro• sudden
quarrel or heat of passion.

Appellant asserted that there is no

evidence on this subject and that the defense is not arguing for a
heat of passion defense allowed to a person of ordinary
sensibilities.
error.

Appellant contends that giving the instruction was

The court of appeals affir•s that this was error but states

that in order to consider whether or not it was prejudicial, it •ust
be considered in coabination with the error in instructing on second
degree •urder.
The discussion on this instruction is fairly extensive.
Briefly, the conflict is over two sets of jury instruction on second
degree •urder that were given.

The first, CALJIC No. 8.30

(California Jury Instruction Cri•inal. Nu•ber 8.30) allows second
degree •urder when there is an intent to kill, but one which is not
as fully deliberated as that belonging to first degree •urder.

The

second set of jury instructions, CALJIC No. 8.31, requires no
specific intent for second degree aurder if the act involved
directly caused the killing.

Appellant contends that the latter

instruction should not have been used.

Appellant contends that the
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jury could not find defendant innocent of second degree aurder on
the basis of the first set of jury instructions because the second
set of instructions, without intent, allowed the charge.

The

defendant's counsel alleged that the second set of instructions
should only be used when the underlying felony is independent of the
killing itself.

The court concludes that this instruction also was

error.
Despite the errors, the court holds that the conviction of
felonious homicide is to be sustained.

It does, however, reduce the

charge fro• second degree aurder to aanslaughter.
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